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  INTRODUCTION   
Time was when U.S. law was thought to stop at its borders. 
Not so anymore. The modern view posits a nation-state system 
in decline and a corresponding need for shared and flexible ju-
risdiction to account for our increasingly interconnected, Inter-
net-centric world—a world that ostensibly defines interests, 
community, and allegiance by criteria other than the clear lines 
of a nation-state’s borders.1 “The ‘borderless’ nature of some ac-
tivities, the near-global nature of others—all of this seems to 
demand regulatory solutions freed from territorial underpin-
nings.”2  
The United States might well like it this way. A superpow-
er no longer bent on conquering more territory stands to benefit 
when it instead can unilaterally project its law and correspond-
ing enforcement resources to regulate what people do in other 
countries. As law accommodates self-interest, the past century 
of U.S. legal doctrine has bypassed traditional territorial limits 
in favor of extraterritorial jurisdiction under various doctrinal 
banners.3 Sometimes it’s “effects jurisdiction” to justify protect-
ing the U.S. economy from foreign actors who don’t play by our 
regulatory rules.4 Sometimes it’s “protective jurisdiction” to 
 
 1. See Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1155, 1230 (2007) [hereinafter Berman, Global Legal Pluralism] (contending 
that “territorial formalisms” are anachronistic and “simply cannot provide a 
rational framework for making jurisdictional judgments”); Austen L. Parrish, 
Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. REV. 815, 
817 (2009) [hereinafter Parrish, Reclaiming] (“Buoyed by concepts of universal 
jurisdiction and loosened constraints on territoriality, the modern Internation-
alists find the traditional view of international lawmaking as the exclusive 
business of nation-states to be anachronistic.”). 
 2. Hannah L. Buxbaum, Territory, Territoriality, and the Resolution of 
Jurisdictional Conflict, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 631, 668 (2009) [hereinafter Bux-
baum, Territory]. 
 3. See infra Part I.B (describing the evolution of U.S. extraterritorial ju-
risdiction jurisprudence and the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law). 
 4. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 769–70 
(1993) (interpreting the Sherman Act’s antitrust liability provisions to apply to 
British companies in the United Kingdom); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 
U.S. 280, 285 (1952) (holding that the Lanham Act for the protection of trade-
marks applies extraterritorially against a U.S. citizen’s use of the Bulova 
watch trademark on watches in Mexico). 
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combat offshore drug traffickers or to safeguard U.S. govern-
ment property from a foreign fraud or influence.5 And some-
times it’s “universal jurisdiction” for the worst-of-the-worst 
global crimes.6 By whatever label, such doctrines of unilaterally 
imposed extraterritorial jurisdiction afford the United States a 
strategic middle ground of control between, at one extreme, 
conquering more countries and, at the other, cooperating by 
treaty with them. This, then, “enabl[es] the United States to 
unilaterally manipulate legal difference so as to better serve its 
interests” while “enhancing American power and interests on 
the world stage.”7 
Yet, despite its own track record of extraterritorial adven-
turism,8 the United States bristles when foreign states seek to 
extend their laws to the territorial United States. The recent 
controversy sparked by a Spanish magistrate’s investigation of 
former U.S. officials for the treatment of terrorism detainees is 
but one example.9 “What next?,” quipped a headline in the Wall 
 
 5. See, e.g., United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 102 (1922) (applying 
U.S. law to an extraterritorial conspiracy aimed at defrauding a shipping 
company owned in part by the U.S. government); United States v. Vilches-
Navarrete, 523 F.3d 1, 22 (1st Cir. 2008) (Lynch & Howard, JJ., concurring in 
part) (stating that the protective principle justifies enforcing laws against off-
shore drug trafficking); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 110 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(holding that the protective principle justified prosecution of an extraterritori-
al plot to destroy U.S. aircraft in an effort to influence U.S. government policy). 
 6. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 831 (2006) (describing federal criminal law 
against unauthorized use of nuclear material, and allowing prosecution in any 
U.S. court of an alleged offender if, “after the conduct required for the offense 
occurs, the [alleged offender] is found in the United States, even if the conduct 
required for the offense occurred outside the United States”); Yousef, 327 F.3d 
at 104, 108–10 (holding that although “the indefinite category of ‘terrorism’ is 
not subject to universal jurisdiction,” a foreign plane bombing plot is prosecut-
able under U.S. law in accordance with the protective principle and the multi-
lateral hijacking convention); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW § 404 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (listing “piracy, slave trade, at-
tacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain 
acts of terrorism” as universal jurisdiction crimes). 
 7. KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE 
EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 7, 224 (2009); see also id. at 
230 (noting that “the legal differences [between countries] in the Westphalian 
system of territorial sovereignty create strong incentives for extraterritoriali-
ty” and that “extraterritoriality should consequently be understood as an im-
portant yet underappreciated alternative to more familiar forms of managing 
difference across jurisdictions, whether more consensual, such as the negotia-
tion of treaties, or more coercive, such as colonization”). 
 8. See infra Appendix pt. B (listing a broad range of U.S. federal statutes 
that apply to conduct outside the United States).  
 9. See Douglas J. Feith, Op-Ed., Spain Has No Right to Try U.S. Officials, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2009, at A17, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
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Street Journal, “Prosecutions for bad advice on global warm-
ing?”10  
Well, exactly why not? Faced with foreign regimes that 
won’t agree to limits on greenhouse gases,11 why can’t the 
United States announce that its own carbon emission limits 
apply to all people and companies worldwide? Faced with a new 
breed of post-9/11 terrorism,12 why can’t the United States pro-
hibit anyone worldwide from supporting or harboring any ter-
rorists? Faced with foreign regimes that filter political content 
on the Internet,13 why can’t the United States globally crimi-
nalize political censorship anywhere on the worldwide web?  
Such new-age scenarios raise age-old questions about the 
legal authority of one state to apply its laws to acts that occur 
in the territory of another.14 As legislator, Congress sometimes 
 
SB123871971773584991.html (“The Spanish magistrate apparently believes 
that it can be a crime for American officials to offer the wrong kind of advice to 
a [P]resident of the United States and, furthermore, it can be a crime punish-
able by a Spanish court. This is a national insult with harmful implications.”). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See, e.g., Edward Wong & Jonathan Ansfield, China Insists that Its 
Steps on Climate Be Voluntary, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2010, at A5, available at 
2010 WLNR 1981188 (“China is banding with other major developing nations 
to stress that only wealthier countries need to make internationally binding 
commitments.”). 
 12. See Edward Rothstein, In a Changing World, an Ever-Evolving Ter-
rorism, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2008, at E38 (reviewing PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR 
AND CONSENT: THE WARS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2008)), available 
at 2008 WLNR 8714405 (describing a new account of terrorism in the twenty-
first century as an ideology “not interested in national liberation or mercantile 
success,” but in “break[ing] down the established order of states and enthron-
[ing] another form of authority (overseen by Islamic jihadists),” with “groups 
[that] are global and decentralized, prepared to ‘outsource’ their attacks and 
readily trade weaponry and secrets”). 
 13. See, e.g., Siobhan Gorman, Web Access Is New Clinton Doctrine, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 21, 2010, at A3 (“The U.S. will make unrestricted access to the In-
ternet a top foreign-policy priority.”); Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of 
State, Remarks on Internet Freedom (Jan. 21, 2010), available at http://www 
.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm (noting that “[w]e stand for a sin-
gle [I]nternet where all of humanity has equal access to knowledge and ideas,” 
but warning that “[s]ome countries have erected electronic barriers that pre-
vent their people from accessing portions of the world’s networks”). 
 14. Different considerations may apply when the issue is what nation’s 
law should govern a transnational dispute about private law (such as a con-
tract) between private parties. This Article focuses on “public law” disputes 
concerning choice of public law regulation in the transnational context. And it 
focuses on the application of U.S. law to conduct that occurs in the territory of 
foreign nation-states, not on the high seas or other areas like Antarctica that 
are not subject to one nation’s sovereignty. 
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speaks to whether its laws should apply abroad.15 More often it 
does not. Congress enacts what I will call “geoambiguous” 
laws—laws that proscribe or regulate conduct but that remain 
silent about whether they apply to acts that occur outside of the 
United States.16  
When confronted with geoambiguous laws, the Supreme 
Court sometimes invokes a presumption against extraterritori-
al jurisdiction, solemnly avowing not to apply U.S. law beyond 
U.S. borders absent clear direction from Congress to do so.17 
Very recently, for example, the Court relied on the presumption 
to decline to apply SEC Rule 10b-5 to foreign securities trans-
actions, despite the fact that the fraudulent conduct alleged to 
have tainted these transactions occurred in the United States.18 
At other times, however, the Court applies geoambiguous laws 
to extraterritorial conduct despite any clearly stated intent of 
Congress.19  
Scholars scold the Court’s inconsistency but are themselves 
deeply divided about how U.S. courts should construe geoambig-
uous laws. The scholars generally fall into one of three camps 
that I will refer to as “judicial unilateralism,” “judicial territo-
rialism,” and “judicial interests-balancing.”20 Among the judi-
cial unilateralists, Professor William Dodge broadly argues that 
 
 15. See, e.g., infra Appendix pts. A, B (listing federal criminal statutes 
that either expressly allow or expressly disallow extraterritorial application). 
 16. See infra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.  
 17. See infra notes 81–100 and accompanying text (explaining important 
Supreme Court decisions that discuss the United States’ presumption against 
extraterritorial application of its laws). 
 18. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2888 (2010). 
 19. See infra notes 107–13, 123–29 and accompanying text. 
 20. The debate about the geographic scope of U.S. statutory law can be 
seen as part of a larger conflict among judges and scholars about how U.S. law 
in general should intersect with and account for foreign and international law. 
See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 43, 52–53 (2004) (contrasting “nationalist jurisprudence,” which “is 
characterized by commitments to territoriality, extreme deference to national 
executive power and political institutions, and resistance to comity or interna-
tional law as meaningful constraints on national prerogatives,” with “transna-
tionalist jurisprudence,” which “assumes America’s political and economic in-
terdependence with other nations operating within the international legal 
system” and in which, “[i]n Justice Blackmun’s words, U.S. courts must look 
beyond narrow U.S. interests to the ‘mutual interests of all nations in a 
smoothly functioning international legal regime’ and, whenever possible, 
should ‘consider if there is a course that furthers, rather than impedes, the de-
velopment of an ordered international system’” (quoting Société Nationale In-
dustrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 555, 567 (1987) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part))).  
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“a court should apply a statute extraterritorially whenever 
doing so appears to advance the purposes of the statute and 
should not worry about resolving conflicts of jurisdiction with 
other nations.”21 According to Dodge, wide leeway for the appli-
cation of U.S. law abroad will counteract systemic under-
regulation of globally harmful activity.22 Moreover, he con-
tends, a clash of U.S. and foreign laws may well spur advanta-
geous diplomatic negotiation to attain a preferred, mutual reso-
lution in place of warring, unilateral legal regimes.23  
In similar fashion, Professor Phillip Trimble asserts that 
“in a world compressed by technology, the imperative of effec-
tive governmental regulation of private behavior is increasingly 
paramount.”24 Therefore, he argues for an “unqualified ‘effects’ 
doctrine”—that courts should apply U.S. statutes to extraterri-
torial conduct whenever that conduct is intended to or does 
have a substantial effect within the United States.25 To the 
same effect, Professor Jonathan Turley argues for a reversal of 
the traditional presumption against extraterritoriality to reflect 
“the contemporary realities of the world economy and environ-
ment in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century.”26 All 
these views are but a subset of “the growing literature on juris-
diction and globalization [that has moved] away from territory, 
 
 21. William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflicts-of-Laws Theory: An 
Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 101, 104–05 (1998) 
[hereinafter Dodge, Extraterritoriality]; see also William S. Dodge, An Econom-
ic Defense of Concurrent Antitrust Jurisdiction, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 27, 34 (2003) 
[hereinafter Dodge, An Economic Defense] (“When Congress is silent about the 
extraterritorial reach of a statute, a court concerned with effectuating con-
gressional intent ought to apply that statute extraterritorially to any conduct 
that causes substantial effects in the United States.”). 
 22. See Dodge, Extraterritoriality, supra note 21, at 152 (“Unilateralism is 
the better approach to extraterritoriality, not because it advances the interests 
of the United States at the expense of other nations but because it is more 
likely to benefit all nations by avoiding underregulation and encouraging in-
ternational agreement.”). 
 23. Id.; see also Dodge, An Economic Defense, supra note 21, at 34–35 (ar-
guing that “Congress may fail to correct the problem of underregulation that 
the presumption against extraterritoriality creates . . . because the consumers 
who would benefit from greater regulation are too disorganized compared with 
industry,” and that “judicial efforts to prevent overregulation of foreigners 
through the presumption against extraterritoriality reduce the incentives of 
foreign governments to negotiate”). 
 24. Phillip R. Trimble, The Supreme Court and International Law: The 
Demise of Restatement Section 403, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 53, 57 (1995). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Jonathan Turley, “When in Rome”: Multinational Misconduct and the 
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 598, 602–03 (1990).  
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and territory-based concepts of regulatory power, as the basis 
for defining the scope of lawmaking authority.”27 
By contrast, judicial territorialists counsel courts to refrain 
from applying U.S. law abroad absent the very clear intent of 
Congress or the express consent of affected foreign states. Pro-
fessor Austen Parrish, for example, has recently argued that 
“territoriality as a constraint on state power should be reinvi-
gorated,” and to do so he suggests that U.S. courts raise the bar 
for when they will extend U.S. law abroad to consistently re-
quire either a “clear statement” or “clear and unmistakable 
. . . intent” of Congress.28 Without adopting Professor Parrish’s 
more traditional territorialist position, Professor Hannah Bux-
baum nonetheless urges that “territorial factors be reinte-
grated” into transnational economic regulatory systems.29 Con-
sistent with territorial concerns, she further contends that U.S. 
courts—when faced with claims seeking to apply U.S. regulato-
ry standards to foreign-based conduct—should seek formal con-
sent of foreign states to adjudication of these claims in the U.S. 
court system.30  
Judicial territorialists can rightly point to the diminishing 
dominance of the United States in the global economy and 
hence the waning efficacy of efforts to impose U.S. law 
abroad.31 Other nations may vitiate U.S. extraterritorialism 
 
 27. Buxbaum, Territory, supra note 2, at 634; see also John H. Knox, A 
Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 351, 388–90 
(2010) (contending that courts should interpret the geographical scope of law 
not in light of whether a law is “extraterritorial” but whether it is “extrajuris-
dictional” in the sense of exceeding background limits of the customary inter-
national law of legislative jurisdiction).  
 28. Austen Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality’s Fifth Business, 
61 VAND. L. REV. 1455, 1493–94 (2008) [hereinafter Parrish, Effects Test]. 
 29. Hannah L. Buxbaum, Conflict of Economic Laws: From Sovereignty to 
Substance, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 934 (2002) [hereinafter Buxbaum, Conflict of 
Economic Laws]; see also Buxbaum, Territory, supra note 2, at 674 (“The use 
of territoriality as a mechanical standard used to link particular conduct with 
a particular country’s law—rightly rejected—must be distinguished from the 
use of territoriality as an expression of a specific understanding about fairness 
and legitimacy in cross-border regulation.”). 
 30. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 251, 308–09 (2006) [hereinafter Buxbaum, Transnational Regulato-
ry Litigation] (contending that “[f ]or transnational litigation to become an ef-
fective element in global economic regulation, the consent of the other coun-
tries involved . . . is necessary,” and that “[t]ransnational litigation initiated 
by private claimants . . . requires a procedural mechanism to obtain the con-
sent of foreign states”). 
 31. See Larry Kramer, Comment, Extraterritorial Application of American 
Law After the Insurance Antitrust Case: A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and 
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with countermeasures (e.g., blocking or clawback statutes).32 
And the U.S. unilateralist example may well embolden emerg-
ing powers to “go on the offensive” and extend their own laws 
abroad to seek to regulate the domestic affairs of the United 
States.33  
More broadly, judicial territorialists worry that unilateral-
ism will tend to crowd out international rulemaking by multilat-
eral consensus. As Professor Parrish contends, “the disassem-
bling of the nation-state and the declining salience of territorial 
borders—to the extent it manifests itself in extraterritorial do-
mestic actions—is a troubling, not a positive, development,” be-
cause “human rights and environmental rights are better pro-
tected when international problems are solved internationally, 
not unilaterally (or even surreptitiously) through domestic liti-
gation.”34 
Straddling the unilateralist and territorialist positions are 
the interests balancers, led by Professor Andreas Lowenfeld 
and memorialized in part in section 403 of the American Law 
Institute’s Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law (Re-
statement).35 The interests balancers come to the fray with no 
 
Trimble, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 750, 756 (1995) (noting that “[w]e have seen in recent 
years how such action invites retaliation and subverts U.S. interests,” and that 
“[t]here may have been a time when the United States was powerful enough to 
dictate terms with impunity,” but “that time has long since passed, and to do 
so today would be futile and counterproductive, as well as inappropriate”). 
 32. See Parrish, Reclaiming, supra note 1, at 864–65; see also Harry L. 
Clark, Dealing with U.S. Extraterritorial Sanctions and Foreign Countermeas-
ures, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 455, 475–81 (2004) (describing the wide range 
of foreign blocking and clawback countermeasures that certain countries have 
taken in response to extraterritorial U.S. sanctions). 
 33. See, e.g., GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL 
LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 569 (4th ed. 2007) (“[A] number of Eu-
ropean states have begun to apply selected national regulatory statutes extra-
territorially, with rigor approaching that of the United States, arousing com-
plaints from both the United States and international businesses.”); 
RAUSTIALA, supra note 7, at 125 (“Some version of the effects principle has 
been adopted by most major powers around the world, including Germany, Ja-
pan, Canada, and the United Kingdom.”); Parrish, Reclaiming, supra note 1, 
at 855–56 (“[F]rom Internet and cyber-cases, to criminal prosecutions, to 
prominent human rights cases, other countries have started to use their laws 
as a way to advance their own foreign policies and to respond to the perceived 
U.S. aspiration of special legal status. As the United States has stepped up its 
claims to extraterritorial jurisdiction, other countries claim ‘me too.’”). 
 34. Parrish, Reclaiming, supra note 1, at 820. 
 35. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, §§ 402, 403 (setting forth potential 
grounds for a state to assert jurisdiction to prescribe law and describing mul-
tiple “reasonableness” factors to be balanced and weighed when more than one 
state has an interest in regulating conduct at issue); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, 
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predilection for extending or restricting the geographical scope 
of U.S. law. Instead, they borrow from modern choice-of-law 
rules to have judges balance the competing interests of the 
United States and foreign states in deciding whether any par-
ticular U.S. law should apply abroad.36 As the interests balanc-
ers see it, strict territoriality is not sufficiently responsive to 
harms from foreign-based conduct, while “a naked or unmodi-
fied effects doctrine fails to respect legitimate sovereignty in-
terests abroad and magnifies and encourages conflicts in an ev-
er more interdependent international economic arena.”37 Their 
solution—broad interests balancing—would enlist courts in the 
assessment of no fewer than eight factors or “interests” when 
deciding whether a U.S. law should apply abroad. Such balanc-
ing would include not only “the likelihood of conflict with regu-
lation by another state” and “the extent to which another state 
might have an interest in regulating the activity,” but also the 
“importance of the regulation to the regulating state” and the 
more general “importance of the regulation to the international 
political, legal, or economic system.”38  
Although each of these three scholarly positions has come 
under mutual cross fire, surprisingly little attention has fo-
cused on theorizing alternative frameworks. In the meantime, 
the conflicted approach of U.S. courts to extraterritoriality re-
 
Conflict, Balancing of Interests, and the Exercise of Jurisdiction to Prescribe: 
Reflections on the Insurance Antitrust Case, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 42, 48–50 
(1995) (advocating the Restatement’s interests-balancing approach). Gary 
Born advances a similar test, based in part upon a blend of section 403 and 
private international conflicts-of-law principles, concluding that U.S. law 
should trump the law of the territorial state only if a court decides that the 
United States has “the most significant relationship” to the conduct in ques-
tion. Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 
LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 86–90, 100 (1992). 
 36. See William S. Dodge, The Public-Private Distinction in the Conflict of 
Laws, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 371, 382 (2008) [hereinafter Dodge, The 
Public-Private Distinction] (“[T]he presumptions about legislative intent to 
which courts often resort when construing [the potentially extraterritorial] 
regulatory statutes might be characterized as external choice-of-law rules in 
disguise. . . . Modern choice-of-law rules tend to give great weight to govern-
mental interests.”). 
 37. Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws: 
The United States and European Community Approaches, 33 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 
11 (1992). 
 38. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 403; see also Alford, supra note 37, at 
16 (conceding that “the jurisdictional rule of reason has its weaknesses,” but 
noting that “it represents the only genuine, though inexact, attempt by courts 
to fashion a jurisdictional test which incorporates the legitimate sovereignty 
interests of foreign nations”). 
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mains more troubling than ever, as globalization explodes and 
a staggering number of U.S. laws are and remain geoambig-
uous.39  
It is time for a new approach, and this Article proposes one 
that I will call the dual-illegality rule. The dual-illegality rule 
would require that U.S. courts decline to interpret geoambig-
uous laws to penalize or regulate conduct that occurs in the ter-
ritory of another state unless the same conduct is also illegal or 
similarly regulated by the law of the foreign territorial state. If, 
however, a U.S. statute or regulation forbids or regulates con-
duct that is already similarly outlawed or regulated by a for-
eign state, then U.S. courts should construe U.S. law to apply 
to the extraterritorial conduct, provided that there exists some 
other prima facie U.S. interest in having its regulation apply 
(such as under traditional prescriptive jurisdictional principles 
of nationality, effects, protective, or universal jurisdiction). 
The dual-illegality rule sensibly blends the best of judicial 
unilateralism with judicial territorialism. First, it preserves the 
central tenet of territorial jurisdiction—to let each nation-state 
definitively decide which acts that take place on its own territo-
ry it should deem illegal or subject to regulation. This is not 
just nostalgia for the old way of doing things. To the contrary, 
territoriality corresponds to a nation-state’s exercise of actual 
physical control. Additionally, it is more definitionally stable in 
its application than traditional prescriptive jurisdictional prin-
ciples that rely on courts to assess intended or actual harm 
from extraterritorial conduct or to make judgments about 
whether certain acts fall within an indefinite and expanding 
list of “universal” crimes.  
Dual illegality is far from a novel concept. Most of our in-
ternational extradition agreements require “dual criminality” 
as a basis for one state to surrender an accused to another.40 
Just as they have been doing for decades in the extradition con-
text, judges are well-suited to make dual-illegality determina-
tions, because they are purely legal determinations that do not 
draw judges into making value judgments about the wisdom or 
need for extraterritorial regulation. That is why a dual-
illegality principle is preferable to the judicial unilateralist ap-
proach (which turns on judges’ highly subjective assessments of 
harms or effects inside the United States from extraterritorial 
 
 39. See infra Appendix pt. C (listing scores of geoambiguous federal crim-
inal statutes). 
 40. See infra notes 240–40, 268–66 and accompanying text. 
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activity), and why it is also preferable to the judicial interests-
balancing approach (which enmeshes judges in policy consider-
ations of the significance of interests at stake for the United 
States and foreign states). 
The greatest concern for political conflict arises when 
judges decide to apply U.S. law to extraterritorial conduct that 
is not prohibited or regulated in the same manner under the 
law of the territorial state. On the other hand, when judges al-
low extraterritorial application of U.S. law to conduct that is 
simultaneously prohibited or similarly regulated by the terri-
torial state, then there is far less reason (or, at least, legitimate 
reason) for the territorial state to complain. The dual-illegality 
rule accommodates the need for some extraterritorial applica-
tion of U.S. law while reducing the likelihood of political con-
flict when the United States seeks to regulate foreign-based ac-
tivity. In short, the response to increasing global transactional 
complexity should be less jurisdictional contestability and 
greater reliance on rules that do not invite judges to engage in 
policy-like assessments of the needs or interests of the United 
States in having its law applied to activity abroad. Our courts 
should employ the dual-illegality rule to decide the scope of 
geoambiguous laws. 
To be sure, the Supreme Court may be unwilling to adopt a 
dual-illegality rule in place of its present approach that shifts 
back and forth from unilateralism to territorialism. Congress 
itself could address this by means of a general interpretive stat-
ute instructing courts to apply geoambiguous law abroad when 
consistent with the dual-illegality rule. At the least, if neither 
the Court nor Congress is prepared to adopt a dual-illegality 
rule, the arguments set forth in this Article may warrant 
greater judicial and legislative awareness of the significance of 
incompatibilities between U.S. and foreign law.  
Part I provides a background on the concepts of “territo-
riality” and “extraterritoriality,” the landmark decisions of U.S. 
courts considering the extraterritorial application of U.S. law, 
and the customary international law of jurisdiction. Part II cri-
tiques the current extraterritorial jurisdictional framework as 
generally applied by U.S. courts today. It focuses on how the 
uneven application of the presumption against extraterritorial-
ity ends up ensnaring judges in a highly subjective interpretive 
process that is inconsistent with the certainty and predictabili-
ty needs that largely justify having jurisdictional rules. Part III 
sets forth the case for a rule of dual illegality to govern U.S. 
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courts in deciding whether—in the absence of instruction from 
Congress—U.S. law should apply to criminalize or regulate 
conduct that occurs in foreign states. It demonstrates how a 
dual-illegality rule can work as it already has in the extradition 
context and responds to potential objections. 
I.  BACKGROUND   
A. DEFINING TERRITORIAL AND EXTRATERRITORIAL LAWS 
This Article focuses on concepts of territorial and extrater-
ritorial law, presupposing the foundation of our global political 
and legal order in a nation-state system. Under this view, 
which is often associated with the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, 
the world is divided into individual nation-states consisting of 
permanent populations of people who live within defined geo-
graphical areas and who are subject to national governments 
that not only regulate internally but also speak for the nation-
state in dealing with other nation-states.41 One can point to a 
handful of “failed” states,42 but most nation-states today are 
soundly intact as political and governing units, with little, if 
any, of their definitional characteristics of territory, population, 
and government subject to serious dispute.43 No, we don’t have 
a single world-governing body. Instead, practically all nation-
states of the world have chosen to join the United Nations to 
 
 41. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 201 (“Under international law, a state 
is an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent population, under 
the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to 
engage in, formal relations with other such entities.”); RAUSTIALA, supra note 
7, at 5 (“At the core of contemporary statehood is the idea, often associated 
with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, that each sovereign state has its own 
discrete and exclusive territory.”); John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and 
Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations, 47 INT’L ORG. 
139, 151 (1993) (“[T]he distinctive feature of the modern system of rule is that 
it has differentiated its subject collectivity into territorially defined, fixed, and 
mutually exclusive enclaves of legitimate dominion.”). 
 42. See, e.g., Leo Abruzzese, The Worst Country on Earth, ECONOMIST, 
Nov. 21, 2009, at Supp. 71 (“Calling Somalia a country is a stretch. It has a 
president, prime minister and parliament, but with little influence outside a 
few strongholds in the capital, Mogadishu. . . . Most of the country is con-
trolled by two armed, radical Islamist factions, al-Shabab (the Youth) and Hiz-
bul Islam (Party of Islam), which regularly battle forces loyal to the government.”).  
 43. Andreas Wimmer & Yuval Weinstein, The Rise of the Nation-State 
Across the World, 1816 to 2001, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 764, 765 (2010) (“The once 
revolutionary template of political legitimacy—self-rule in the name of a na-
tion of equal citizens—is now almost universally adopted. This framework is 
recognized as the essence of modern statehood, so much so that the terms ‘na-
tions’ and ‘states’ are often used interchangeably.”). 
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facilitate cooperation among individual nation-states.44 Indeed 
a core principle of the UN Charter is reciprocal recognition and 
preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of indi-
vidual nation-state members.45 After all, “‘it would be impossi-
ble to have a society of sovereign states unless each state, while 
claiming sovereignty for itself, recognized that every other state 
had the right to claim and enjoy its own sovereignty as well.’”46 
Many scholars herald the decline of the nation-state sys-
tem, positing the emergence of globally pluralistic and cosmo-
politan legal regimes that invest power in varied international 
and transnational organizations, as well as with non-state ac-
tors.47 But the fact remains that even today multilateral insti-
tutions are “relatively underdeveloped compared to the private 
and public domains of any reasonably functioning sovereign 
country,” while “[t]he nation-state remains the prevalent organ-
izational source of authority and to variable extents the domi-
nant one.”48 The European Union, for example, is an immensely 
important international institution but employs fewer people 
 
 44. See UN at a Glance, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/ 
index.shtml (last visited Oct. 19, 2010). 
 45. U.N. Charter art. 2, paras. 1, 4 (noting that the UN “is based on the 
principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members,” and that “[a]ll Members 
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”). 
 46. Ruggie, supra note 41, at 162 (quoting MARTIN WIGHT, SYSTEMS OF 
STATES 135 (1977)). 
 47. See, e.g., Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 1169–79; 
Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 
501–12 (2002); William W. Burke-White, International Legal Pluralism, 25 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 963, 969–70 (2004); Buxbaum, Conflict of Economic Laws, 
supra note 29, at 943–44. 
 48. SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS 1, 419 (2006). Rather 
than subscribing to a view that “nothing has much changed in terms of state 
power” or focusing on “the proposition of the declining significance of the 
state,” Sassen advances the existence of an “intermediate zone” in which indi-
vidual nation-states remain primary decisional loci but have changed—such as 
through the concentration of executive power, the recognition of privatization, 
and the joining of transgovernmental networks—in response to the forces of 
globalization. Id. at 269–71, 401, 419; see also Paul Schiff Berman, Dialectical 
Regulation, Territoriality, and Pluralism, 38 CONN. L. REV. 929, 940, 952 
(2006) (discussing how “deterritorialized effects and affiliation combine with 
the persistent territoriality of coercive enforcement,” and urging that “we 
should conceptualize legal jurisdiction and the assertion of regulatory authority 
more capaciously as jurispersuasion, focusing not so much on the [territorial] 
power to enforce legal norms, but the [nonterritorial] ability to articulate them”). 
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(30,000) than the state of West Virginia (44,000).49 Interna-
tional legal norms and institutions will grow and develop in 
many complex ways, yet nation-state governments will retain 
for the foreseeable future an essential and primary role in 
world governance, if only to consent to and enforce rules that 
others may decide to propose.50 
Just as the nation-state system is fundamental to our polit-
ical worldview, “the organizing principle of modern government 
is territoriality,” which refers to “the organization and exercise 
of power over defined blocs of space” within a nation-state’s 
borders.51 Territorial jurisdiction connotes the application of le-
gal rules within territorial space, and it is the most widely ac-
cepted source of a nation-state’s authority to make, enforce, and 
adjudicate legal rules.52 
This Article defines a nation-state’s law to be territorial if 
it prohibits or regulates a human act or conduct that occurs 
within the nation-state’s borders.53 By contrast, a law is extra-
territorial if it governs acts that occur outside the nation-state’s 
borders, even if committed by the nation’s own citizens.54 The 
 
 49. BARRY E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 538 (Aspen Publishers 
5th ed. 2007). 
 50. RAUSTIALA, supra note 7, at 8–9 (contending that despite claims that 
the world is “flat” and that “political boundaries matter little and economic 
and social forces move freely,” “[t]hese claims [in fact] contain elements of 
truth, but are strongly overstated” because “[s]overeign borders still matter 
greatly for economic and political life,” while “territoriality even rules the vir-
tual world; the Internet is subject to the control of sovereign states and in-
creasingly ‘bordered’ in its structure”). 
 51. Id. at 5. 
 52. See id.; see also Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 
731 F.2d 909, 921 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (emphasizing that “[t]he prerogative of a 
nation to control and regulate activities within its boundaries is an essential, 
definitional element of sovereignty,” and that “the territoriality base of juris-
diction is universally recognized” and “is the most pervasive and basic prin-
ciple underlying the exercise by nations of prescriptive regulatory power”). 
 53. Buxbaum, Territory, supra note 2, at 636; Larry Kramer, Vestiges of 
Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 179, 
181 (1992) [hereinafter Kramer, Vestiges of Beale]; Jeffrey A. Meyer, Second 
Thoughts on Secondary Sanctions, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 905, 946 (2009). 
 54. Cf. William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extra-
territoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 87–88 (1998) [hereinafter Dodge, 
Understanding the Presumption] (noting that “[f ]or regulatory purposes, one 
may distinguish between the conduct of an activity and the effects of an activi-
ty,” and that “[w]hen both the conduct and the effects of an activity occur en-
tirely within a single state, one may safely characterize that state’s regulation 
of the activity as ‘territorial,’” but that when “the conduct, the effects, or both 
occur outside the regulating state, the regulation may be characterized as 
‘extraterritorial’ to at least some degree”). 
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territorial/extraterritorial distinction in the law focuses on the 
location of the acts or conduct that a law explicitly controls, re-
gardless of where any effects or consequences of such acts 
might be felt and regardless of any purpose, intent, or motive of 
the regulation to influence second-order conduct.55 If, for exam-
ple, a U.S. law prohibits consumers in the United States from 
purchasing African elephant tusks, this is a territorial regula-
tion of consumer conduct within the United States, despite its 
apparent purpose or effect in part to discourage killing of en-
dangered elephants in Africa.56 By contrast, if a U.S. law were 
to expressly prohibit people in Canada from firing guns, this 
would be an extraterritorial law, whether applied to a polar 
bear hunter at the Arctic Circle or to an assassin in Canada 
who aims across the border to murder someone in the United 
States. 
Two more caveats need to be considered. First, this is an 
article about the geographical scope of federal statutory law, 
not the geographical scope of the U.S. Constitution—whether 
citizens or non-citizens of the United States should have rights 
 
 55. This focus on the place of the act rather than the place of its eventual 
effect (if different) is consistent with the general approach taken for evaluat-
ing where criminal acts take place. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3236 (2006) (“In all 
cases of murder or manslaughter, the offense shall be deemed to have been 
committed at the place where the injury was inflicted, or the poison adminis-
tered or other means employed which caused the death, without regard to the 
place where the death occurs.”). Federal appeals courts do not agree about 
what it means for a law to be “extraterritorial” in scope. Compare Boim v. Holy 
Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 690 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc) 
(“Congress has the power to impose liability for acts that occur abroad but 
have effects within the United States, but it must make the extraterritorial 
scope of a statute clear.” (internal citation omitted)), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 
325 (2009), with United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1130 
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Because conduct with substantial domestic effects implicates 
a state’s legitimate interest in protecting its citizens within its borders, Con-
gress’s regulation of foreign conduct meeting this ‘effects’ test is ‘not an extra-
territorial assertion of jurisdiction.’” (quoting Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 923), 
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3501 (2010)). 
 56. Meyer, supra note 53, at 957 (“If . . . a U.S. sanctions law prohibits 
U.S. companies in the United States from doing business with a French arms 
merchant that trades with Iran, then it cannot be said that the U.S. law regu-
lates the French merchant at all[, because although t]he U.S. law may disad-
vantage the merchant, perhaps severely so in hopes of effectuating a change 
by the French company in its business conduct[,] . . . the law still does not re-
gulate the French merchant, as he faces no consequences at the hands of the 
U.S. government for failure to conform.”). As I have argued elsewhere, a regu-
lation may have multiple purposes—both inward- and outward-looking—such 
that it makes little sense to judge a law’s jurisdictional validity by its “extra-
territorial” intent or purpose. See id. at 957–60. 
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under the U.S. Constitution arising from U.S. governmental ac-
tivity in foreign countries.57 Nor is this an article about the 
power of U.S. troops and police to invade other countries to en-
force what may be called U.S. extraterritorial law. Instead, this 
Article focuses on the far more common scenario of the U.S. 
courts’ territorial enforcement of extraterritorial law—in which 
a U.S. court interprets U.S. law to apply to extraterritorial acts 
and, as a result, enforces this law territorially against persons, 
companies, or property in the United States over which the 
U.S. court otherwise has personal jurisdiction. This can happen 
by means of a U.S. governmental prosecution or civil enforce-
ment action in a U.S. court, or by means of a suit between pri-
vate parties for enforcement of a U.S. statute. Thus, as Jack 
Goldsmith has noted, “the concept of extraterritoriality can be 
misleading,” because “[i]t does not (usually) mean that a nation 
enforces its law abroad,” but rather that “a nation uses the 
threat of force against local persons or property to punish, and 
thus regulate, extraterritorial acts that cause local harms.”58  
B. EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND U.S. LAW 
It is now well-established that if Congress chooses to do so, 
it is free to regulate conduct outside the United States and in 
disregard of any limits posed by international law.59 Although 
 
 57. For excellent analyses of issues raised by claims that the U.S. Consti-
tution applies abroad, see generally José A. Cabranes, Our Imperial Criminal 
Procedure: Problems in the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Constitutional 
Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1660 (2009), and Chimène I. Keitner, Rights Beyond Bor-
ders, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1480886. 
 58. Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Terri-
torial Sovereignty, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 475, 479 (1998); see also 
RAUSTIALA, supra note 7, at 229 (noting that the rise of U.S. extraterritorial-
ism “required that the relevant actors have some valuable asset or stake in the 
jurisdiction-asserting state that made them vulnerable to suit,” and that “for 
an enormous market like the United States this was often true”). 
 59. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 86 (2d Cir. 2003); see also EEOC 
v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“Both parties concede, as 
they must, that Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the ter-
ritorial boundaries of the United States.”); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 
388, 423 (1815) (Marshall, C.J.) (noting that while courts are “bound by the 
law of nations which is a part of the law of the land,” Congress may “manifest 
[its] will” to apply a different rule “by passing an act for the purpose”); Yousef, 
327 F.3d at 93 (“If a statute makes plain Congress’s intent (instead of employ-
ing ambiguous or ‘general’ words), then Article III courts, which can overrule 
Congressional enactments only when such enactments conflict with the Con-
stitution, must enforce the intent of Congress irrespective of whether the stat-
ute conforms to customary international law.” (internal citation omitted)).  
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specific international rules may be given domestic effect by 
U.S. courts,60 the Constitution does not subrogate our govern-
ment or citizenry to the dictates of international law.61 To the 
contrary, the Constitution has numerous provisions authoriz-
ing the President and Congress to regulate matters affecting 
foreign affairs,62 and the national government may use that 
lawmaking authority to transcend or extend the scope of any 
specific structural limit on the power of the political branches 
under the Constitution.63 Absent a rare showing that a particu-
lar extraterritorial application of U.S. law would be arbitrary 
and unfair in violation of constitutional due process,64 or that it 
 
 60. Treaties have formal status as U.S. law under the Constitution’s Su-
premacy Clause, see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, and the Supreme Court has 
otherwise concluded that customary international law is a part of U.S. law to 
the extent not superseded by domestic U.S. law. See, e.g., The Paquete Haba-
na, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 714 (1900) (applying customary international law to 
protect a Cuban fishing smack from capture as a prize of war, because 
“[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and adminis-
tered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of 
right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination,” but only for 
cases “where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or 
judicial decision”). 
 61. The Supremacy Clause references “treaties” (one form of international 
law) along with the Constitution itself and federal statutes as supreme to the 
law of individual states. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. This does not elevate trea-
ties, however, over domestic law in general, as Congress may enact laws su-
perseding “the law of nations” if “the affirmative intention of the Congress [is] 
clearly expressed.” McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Hondu-
ras, 372 U.S. 10, 21–22 (1963) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, a later-in-
time federal statute may trump a formal international treaty, see Breard v. 
Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998), and treaties may not be given effect by 
courts as U.S. domestic law unless deemed to be self-executing or implemented 
by a later act of Congress, see Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–05 (2008).  
 62. See, e.g., Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterri-
torial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and Interna-
tional Law, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 121, 136–58 (2007) [hereinafter Colangelo, 
Constitutional Limits] (discussing at length the foreign affairs powers granted 
under the Constitution to the political branches). 
 63. See, e.g., Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958) (“The States that 
joined together to form a single Nation and to create, through the Constitu-
tion, a Federal Government to conduct the affairs of that Nation must be held 
to have granted that Government the powers indispensable to its functioning 
effectively in the company of sovereign nations.”); United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318–20 (1936) (“‘As a nation with all the 
attributes of sovereignty, the United States is vested with all the powers of 
government necessary to maintain an effective control of international rela-
tions.’” (quoting Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378, 396 (1933)). 
 64. See, e.g., United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(noting that for the criminal prosecution of an offshore drug trafficker “due 
process requires the Government to demonstrate that there exists ‘a sufficient 
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would otherwise exceed the subject-matter authority of Con-
gress’s power under Article I of the Constitution,65 Congress is 
generally free to regulate conduct in foreign countries, and U.S. 
courts in turn are free to enforce and adjudicate congressional 
laws against individuals who are otherwise properly subject to 
their personal jurisdiction.66  
If Congress’s general power to regulate foreign conduct is 
clear, the next question is whether, in a specific instance, Con-
gress actually intends to do so. At times, Congress carefully de-
limits its laws to apply only to conduct that occurs within the 
United States.67 At other times, Congress directs that its laws 
 
nexus between the conduct condemned and the United States’ such that the 
application of the statute would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair to 
the defendant” (quoting United States v. Medjuck, 48 F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th 
Cir. 1995)); id. at 1161 n.14 (citing contrary cases that decline to require such 
a nexus); see also Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality 
and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1260–63 (1992) 
(describing possible due process limits on the extraterritorial application of 
U.S. law); Colangelo, Constitutional Limits, supra note 62, at 158–76 (same); 
cf. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413–19 
(1984) (stating that adjudicative due process requires “minimum contacts” for 
a U.S. court to have personal jurisdiction over foreign-based defendants in a 
civil action). This Article focuses on what U.S. courts may do as to criminal or 
civil defendants over whom they otherwise have personal jurisdiction to en-
force Congress’s regulation of conduct that occurs abroad. The limitations that 
the Constitution may place on U.S. governmental enforcement of conduct that 
takes place outside U.S. borders is beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 766–71 (2008) (recognizing the constitu-
tional right of habeas corpus for enemy combatant aliens detained at Guantá-
namo Bay, Cuba); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265–75 
(1990) (declining to apply the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to the 
search and seizure—directed by U.S. agents—of property owned by a nonresi-
dent alien and located in a foreign country); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 7–14 
(1957) (recognizing the right to a jury trial for U.S. citizen defendants charged 
with capital murder on a foreign military base). 
 65. See, e.g., Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 VA. 
L. REV. 972–85 (2010) [hereinafter Colangelo, Foreign Commerce Clause] (ar-
guing in favor of certain limits on Congress under the Foreign Commerce 
Clause to extend its law to foreign-based conduct); Eugene Kontorovich, 
Beyond the Article I Horizon: Congress’s Enumerated Powers and Universal 
Jurisdiction over Drug Crimes, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1191, 1194 (2009) (arguing 
that “the Define and Punish Clause does not generally authorize Congress to 
regulate foreign conduct with no demonstrable U.S. connection,” and therefore 
“Congress cannot punish dog-fighting by Indonesians in Java because Con-
gress has not been authorized by the Constitution to make such laws”). This 
Article does not address such arguments for constitutional constraints on the 
extraterritorial extension of U.S. law. 
 66. See, e.g., Colangelo, Foreign Commerce Clause, supra note 65, at 950–57. 
 67. See infra Appendix pt. A (listing federal criminal laws that Congress 
has restricted to conduct occurring within the United States). 
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be applied extraterritorially or, for criminal statutes, does the 
functional equivalent by instructing courts to apply the law 
against any defendant who may later be found in the United 
States.68 Most often, however, Congress says nothing at all 
about its laws’ geographical limits.69 Scores of federal criminal 
statutes, for example, say nothing about whether they apply to 
conduct that occurs wholly in foreign countries.70 Other major 
federal civil regulatory statutes often lack geographical preci-
sion.71 
 
 68. See infra Appendix pt. B (listing federal criminal laws with express 
extraterritoriality provisions). 
 69. Born, supra note 35, at 7 (“In the overwhelming majority of cases, 
however, federal statutes are couched in the most general terms and suggest 
no meaningful geographic limits.”); Dodge, The Public-Private Distinction, su-
pra note 36, at 379 (observing that “[s]ometimes Congress speaks directly to 
the extraterritorial scope of its regulatory laws,” but “[f ]requently, though, 
Congress does not specify the extraterritorial reach of its regulatory laws”); 
Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2162, 2237 (2002) (“[L]egislatures (and certainly Congress) rarely think 
about the extraterritorial application of their statutes.”); Kramer, Vestiges of 
Beale, supra note 53, at 183 (explaining that not only may Congress “find it 
difficult to specify extraterritorial scope in detail,” but “the need for interna-
tional application may not be apparent at the time of enactment and . . . will 
often be overlooked anyway”); Ellen S. Podgor, A New Dimension to the Prose-
cution of White Collar Crime: Enforcing Extraterritorial Social Harms, 37 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 83, 95–96 (2006) (describing the range of federal statutes 
that are not clear about geographical scope). 
 70. See the Appendix to this Article for a listing of federal geoambiguous 
laws. Infra Appendix pt. C. Many of these statutes presumably rely upon the 
Foreign Commerce Clause of the Constitution by expressly referencing con-
duct relating to “foreign commerce.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Yet, as Pro-
fessor Anthony Colangelo has recently described, such invocation of the For-
eign Commerce Clause may be “inward-looking” to govern activity inside the 
United States or “outward-looking” to govern conduct in foreign countries. See 
generally Colangelo, Foreign Commerce Clause, supra note 65.  
 71. See, e.g., Max Huffman, A Retrospective on Twenty-Five Years of the 
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 285, 286–87 
(2007) (Sherman Act, even as amended in 1982 by the Foreign Trade Antitrust 
Improvements Act); see also Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 
2869, 2878–79 (2010) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934); McBee v. Delica Co., 
417 F.3d 107, 117 (1st Cir. 2005) (Lanham Act—federal trademark law); ARC 
Ecology v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force, 411 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2005) (Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, 
also known as the “Superfund” law)); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 
528, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)); Amlon 
Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 672–76 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)). But see Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T 
Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454–56 (2007) (noting that Congress has expressly limited 
application of patent law to the territorial United States with one exception). 
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And so courts are left to decide the geographical scope of 
federal law in the face of an uncertain congressional intent. At 
times, the Supreme Court pays homage to a “‘longstanding 
principle of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a 
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of the United States.’”72 The Court justifies 
this principle on the assumption that Congress “‘is primarily 
concerned with domestic conditions,’”73 acting “to protect 
against unintended clashes between our laws and those of oth-
er nations which could result in international discord.”74 Other 
times, however, the Court frequently overlooks the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality and applies U.S. law abroad de-
spite any clearly stated intent of Congress.75 In short, as Pro-
fessor Einer Elhauge has noted, the presumption “has been 
strongly critiqued both normatively and for its inconsistent ap-
plication.”76  
The current debate about the extraterritorial application of 
U.S. law is best understood in light of the past two centuries of 
precedent and the background principles of the customary law 
 
 72. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 
499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).  
 73. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248 (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 
336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)); see also Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (explaining 
that the presumption “rests on the perception that Congress ordinarily legis-
lates with respect to domestic, not foreign matters”). 
 74. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248. 
 75. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 769–70 
(1993) (affirming extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law, but doing 
so without mentioning the presumption against extraterritoriality); Sale v. 
Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 206 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that despite the presumption against extraterritoriality, “general-
ly worded laws covering varying subject matters are routinely applied extra-
territorially” in the absence of expressed intent of Congress that a law be 
applied as such); RAUSTIALA, supra note 7, at 99 (noting that “the presumption 
is frequently overcome, . . . sometimes because courts simply soften the test,” 
and sometimes because “judges have [ ] ignored the presumption entirely.”). 
 76. Elhauge, supra note 69, at 2235–36 (“[C]ourts tend to apply the canon 
to nonmarket statutes (like nondiscrimination, labor, or environmental law) 
but not to market statutes (like antitrust, securities, or trademark law), which 
instead are interpreted to extend to extraterritorial conduct having substan-
tial effects within the enacting nation.”); see also Dodge, Understanding the 
Presumption, supra note 54, at 86–91 (discussing varying meanings of the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality and proposing that “the presumption 
should not be considered a clear statement rule and should be deemed rebut-
ted when there is good reason to think that Congress was focused on some-
thing other than domestic conditions”). 
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of international jurisdiction.77 Part I.B.1 below traces the evo-
lution of significant court rulings that reveal a shift from strict 
territorialism to broad extraterritorialism. Part I.B.2 then out-
lines the contemporary U.S. view of the customary law of inter-
national jurisdiction as set forth in the Restatement.78 
1. The Evolving U.S. Law of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction  
The evolution of the American law of extraterritorial juris-
diction has been well told by leading scholars.79 The story often 
starts with the reign of strict territorial jurisdiction from the 
early days of the republic.80 In the 1812 case of The Schooner 
Exchange v. M’Faddon, Chief Justice John Marshall observed 
that “[t]he world [was] composed of distinct sovereignties, pos-
sessing equal rights and equal independence.”81 According to 
Marshall, “[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within its own terri-
tory is necessarily exclusive and absolute.”82 Marshall noted 
that this “full and absolute territorial jurisdiction” was the 
 
 77. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, §§ 402, 403. The Restatement claims 
not only that its jurisdictional rules “reflect development in the law as given 
effect by United States courts,” but also that “[i]ncreasingly” its rules “have 
been followed by other states and their courts and by international tribunals, 
and have emerged as principles of customary law.” Id. pt. IV, introductory note. 
 78. Although the Supreme Court has relied on the Restatement as a rule 
of customary international law, see, e.g., Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 799, con-
siderable dispute exists over whether the Restatement is properly deemed a 
“source” of international law and whether it accurately describes the custom-
ary law of international jurisdiction. See also United States v. Yousef, 327 
F.3d 56, 99–100, 104 (2d Cir. 2003) (declining to rely on the Restatement’s de-
finition of “universal jurisdiction”). 
 79. See generally RAUSTIALA, supra note 7, at 93–125; Dodge, Extraterri-
toriality, supra note 21, at 121–43; Parrish, Effects Test, supra note 28, at 
1462–78. 
 80. One might imagine a world not too long ago when law ran with the 
person, rather than the territory in which a person lives. See, e.g., MARIANNE 
CONSTABLE, THE LAW OF THE OTHER: THE MIXED JURY AND CHANGING 
CONCEPTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP, LAW, AND KNOWLEDGE 7 (1994) (describing the 
pre-Modern Europe era of “personal law” in which “the law of the community 
to which a person belong[ed] determine[d] the law applied to the person and 
his or her transactions,” distinguishable “from a principle of ‘territoriality’ in 
which the laws or customs of a place govern all those who reside there”). 
 81. The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 
(1812). In Schooner Exchange, the Supreme Court concluded that the United 
States had implicitly consented not to exercise its jurisdiction to enforce a libel 
claim against a French war ship in the port of Philadelphia. Id. at 145–47. Al-
though this case involved the limits of a court’s adjudicative jurisdiction, the 
opinion speaks in terms that do not distinguish between adjudicative and pre-
scriptive jurisdiction in the territorial context. 
 82. Id. at 136. 
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“attribute of every sovereign” and was altogether “incapable of 
conferring extra-territorial power.”83 Put differently, no nation 
could purport to regulate acts in another absent the consent of 
the territorial state. Any exceptions to the “full and complete 
power of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up 
to the consent of the nation itself” and may “flow from no other 
legitimate source.”84 
True enough, it was thought that a nation-state might also 
regulate on the basis of citizenship. But, according to Marshall, 
a nation’s territorial jurisdiction trumped even the jurisdiction 
of foreign states to decide what their own citizens may do 
abroad. 
When private individuals of one nation spread themselves through 
another as business or caprice may direct, mingling indiscriminately 
with the inhabitants of that other, . . . it would be obviously inconven-
ient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual 
infraction, and the government to degradation, if such individuals or 
merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not 
amenable to the jurisdiction of the country.85 
Sounding the same tune of territorial triumphalism, Jus-
tice Joseph Story wrote for the Court in The Apollon in 1824 
that “[t]he laws of no nation can justly extend beyond its own 
territories” and “[t]hey can have no force to control the sov-
ereignty or rights of any other nation, within its own jurisdic-
tion.”86 A unanimous Court in The Apollon accordingly declined 
to allow a U.S. duties law to apply to cargo traversing Spanish 
territorial waters.87 
Several decades later, the Supreme Court in 1880 summa-
rized three interlocking rules of strict territorial jurisdiction as 
set forth by Justice Story in his leading treatise on conflicts of 
laws. First, “every nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty 
and jurisdiction within its own territory,” such that “the laws of 
every state affect, and bind directly all property, whether real 
or personal, within its territory; and all persons who are resi-
dent within it, whether naturalborn subjects, or aliens; and al-
 
 83. Id. at 137. 
 84. Id. at 136.  
 85. Id. at 144.  
 86. The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824). To be sure, Justice 
Story suggested the possibility of an exception to the lack of power of one state 
to apply its law to acts in another state in the case of regulation of its own citi-
zens. Id. He did not, however, suggest that the law of the citizen-regulating 
state would prevail over the law of the territorial state of conduct. 
 87. Id. 
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so all contracts made, and acts done within it.”88 The second 
rule stated that “no state or nation can, by its laws, directly af-
fect, or bind property out of its own territory, or persons not 
resident therein.”89 The third rule acknowledged the power of 
one state to consent to the application in its own territory of the 
law of another state by asserting that “whatever force and obli-
gation the laws of one country have in another, depends solely 
upon the laws of the latter, that is to say, upon its own proper 
jurisprudence and polity, and upon its own express or tacit con-
sent.”90 
With the dawn of a new century, territoriality held stead-
fast as the paramount rule governing the authority of one state 
to apply its law to acts occurring in another. As the Supreme 
Court acknowledged in 1901, U.S. law could not protect U.S. 
citizens from liability for their acts done in a foreign country. 
“When an American citizen commits a crime in a foreign coun-
try he cannot complain if required to submit to such modes of 
trial and to such punishment as the laws of that country may 
prescribe for its own people . . . .”91 Correlatively, as the Court 
would acknowledge twelve years later, the United States could 
regulate foreigners who ventured into U.S. territory. “If we may 
not control foreign citizens or corporations operating in foreign 
territory, we certainly may control such citizens and corpora-
tions operating in our territory, as we undoubtedly may control 
our own citizens and our own corporations.”92 
Strict territoriality meant that U.S. law could not regulate 
acts in other countries. In the landmark 1909 case, American 
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., the Supreme Court, through 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, declined to apply the Sherman 
Act to alleged market-predatory practices in Central America.93 
 
 88. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN 
AND DOMESTIC 19 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1834). 
 89. Id. at 21. 
 90. Id. at 24. 
 91. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 123 (1901); see also Munaf v. Geren, 
553 U.S. 674, 694–95 (2008) (relying upon Schooner Exchange and Neely to 
deny a habeas claim of a prisoner in U.S. custody in Iraq in which the prisoner 
claimed that the United States lacked authority to transfer the prisoner to 
Iraqi custody for criminal prosecution; the Court reasoned that exclusive terri-
torial jurisdiction holds “true with respect to American citizens who travel 
abroad and commit crimes in another nation whether or not the pertinent 
criminal process comes with all the rights guaranteed by our Constitution”). 
 92. United States v. Pac. & Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87, 106 
(1913). 
 93. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 358–59 (1909).  
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Despite the fact that both the plaintiff and defendant compa-
nies were U.S. companies, Holmes derided the plaintiff ’s case 
for its reliance on some “rather startling propositions” of extra-
territorial jurisdiction, as “the acts causing the damage were 
done . . . outside the jurisdiction of the United States and with-
in that of other states.”94 He thought “[i]t [wa]s surprising to 
hear it argued [by the plaintiff] that [the acts outside the Unit-
ed States] were governed by the act of Congress.”95  
Justice Holmes then famously declared it to be the “general 
and almost universal rule” that “the character of an act as law-
ful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the 
country where the act is done.”96 He noted the likelihood of in-
dividual injustice as well as diplomatic friction that might re-
sult from a contrary rule allowing extraterritorial application of 
U.S. law: 
For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to 
treat him according to its own notions rather than those of the place 
where he did the acts, not only would be unjust, but would be an in-
terference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the 
comity of nations, which the other state concerned justly might re-
sent.97 
In light of the background principle of strict territoriality, 
Justice Holmes suggested that “[a]ll legislation is prima facie 
territorial,” and that “in case of doubt,” a statute such as the 
Sherman Act should be construed “as intended to be confined in 
its operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the 
lawmaker has general and legitimate power.”98 For Holmes, 
“the improbability of the United States attempting to make 
acts done in Panama or Costa Rica criminal is obvious,” and it 
was “entirely plain that what the defendant did in Panama or 
Costa Rica is not within the scope of the statute so far as the 
present suit is concerned.”99 He added that “not only were the 
acts of the defendant in Panama or Costa Rica not within the 
Sherman Act, but they were not torts by the law of the place, 
and therefore were not torts at all, however contrary to the eth-
ical and economic postulates of that statute.”100 
 
 94. Id. at 355. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 356.  
 97. Id. (citing Phillips v. Eyre, [1869] 4 L.R.Q.B. 225, 239 (Cockburn C.J.)). 
 98. Id. at 357 (internal quotation omitted). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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Despite the nearly strict-territorial view of American Ba-
nana, only two years later Holmes himself surprisingly shifted 
to embrace a far broader vision of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
when considering whether the law of one U.S. state might be 
applied to conduct occurring in another U.S. state. In Stras-
sheim v. Daily, Holmes wrote on behalf of the Court that “[a]cts 
done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and pro-
ducing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punish-
ing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the ef-
fect, if the State should succeed in getting him within its 
power.”101 It followed that Michigan could permissibly apply its 
law to fraudulent acts that occurred in Illinois. This “effects” 
principle was, in Holmes’s view, consistent with the “usage of 
the civilized world,”102 and he did nothing to suggest that the 
effects principle ought not to apply with equal force in the in-
ternational context. 
Sixteen years later the Supreme Court again narrowed its 
territoriality jurisprudence in a pair of cases involving crimes 
that took place in part within the United States. In United 
States v. Sisal Sales Corp., the Court considered once again the 
transnational application of the Sherman Act—this time in-
volving two U.S. companies and a Mexican company alleged to 
have monopolized the market and trade for a Mexican-grown 
plant fiber known as sisal, which was used to make most of the 
binder twine then used for the harvesting of grain crops in the 
United States.103 Concluding that the facts were “radically dif-
ferent” for jurisdictional purposes from American Banana, the 
Court observed that the conspiracy occurred within the United 
States and involved some overt acts taken inside the United 
States (in addition to others in Mexico).104 Also, the conspira-
tors’ “own deliberate acts, here and elsewhere[,] . . . brought 
about forbidden results within the United States,” and thus 
were properly subject to U.S. antitrust law.105 Similarly, in 
Ford v. United States, the Court affirmed application of U.S. 
law against illegal liquor traffickers who were on a ship on the 
 
 101. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911). 
 102. Id. at 284. 
 103. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 271–72 (1927). 
 104. Id. at 275–76. 
 105. Id. at 276. See also Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 371 
(2005) (holding that the statute prohibiting a scheme to defraud Canadian liq-
uor importation taxes was not given improper extraterritorial effect where it 
was applied solely to the conduct of schemers inside the United States). 
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high seas but who conspired with persons in the United States 
to smuggle liquor into the United States.106 
While the outcome in Ford and Sisal Sales could be recon-
ciled with American Banana because of the difference in where 
some of the conduct took place, already there was some indica-
tion by the 1920s of the Supreme Court’s willingness to relax 
territoriality concerns if practical needs seemed to demand it. 
In 1922, the Court announced in United States v. Bowman 
what amounted to an exception to the usual rule of strict terri-
toriality for cases of crimes victimizing the U.S. government.107 
At issue in Bowman was the validity of a criminal charge 
against a group of U.S. citizens arising from a conspiracy that 
started on board a ship on the high seas heading from the 
United States toward Brazil and that continued after the ship 
reached port in Brazil.108 The plotters sought to defraud the 
owner of the ship by fraudulently overbilling for the fuel oil 
that was to be loaded on the ship in Brazil.109 Although neither 
the hatching of the plot nor any of its overt acts occurred in the 
United States, the men were eventually arrested and charged 
in a New York federal court for conspiracy to defraud a corpo-
ration in which the U.S. government was a stockholder.110 De-
spite the fact that the text of the federal fraud statute did not 
expressly apply to acts outside U.S. territory, the Supreme 
Court rejected the defendants’ arguments that the statute did 
not apply to them. Contrasting the strict territoriality rule ap-
plied in the civil antitrust context in American Banana, the 
Court observed: 
[T]he same rule of interpretation should not be applied to criminal 
statutes which are, as a class, not logically dependent on their locality 
for the Government’s jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right 
of the Government to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wher-
ever perpetrated, especially if committed by its own citizens, officers 
or agents.111 
The Court acknowledged that the same extraterritorial 
principle ought not to apply for ordinary crimes against “pri-
vate individuals or their property” and that ordinary crimes 
like murder, larceny, or fraud “which affect the peace and good 
order of the community, must of course be committed within 
 
 106. Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 619–24 (1927).  
 107. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 101–03 (1922). 
 108. Id. at 95–96. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 96. 
 111. Id. at 98. 
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the territorial jurisdiction of the government where it may 
properly exercise it.”112 Yet for crimes victimizing U.S. govern-
ment interests (even pecuniary, non-national-security inter-
ests), the Bowman Court seemed to say that territoriality no 
longer mattered. 
The Court in Bowman stood willing to infer a statute’s 
extraterritorial applicability despite the absence of statutory 
text to suggest that it should apply outside the United States. 
Perceived necessity seemed to justify this leap because “to limit 
the[] locus to the strictly territorial jurisdiction would be great-
ly to curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute [penalizing 
fraud against the U.S. government] and leave open a large im-
munity for frauds as easily committed by citizens on the high 
seas and in foreign countries as at home.”113 The Court strayed 
from deciding what Congress actually intended to surmising 
what Congress might have intended.114 
Bowman is best viewed in its emerging international law 
context. The case was decided shortly before the Permanent 
Court of International Justice (PCIJ)—the League of Nations’ 
predecessor to the United Nations International Court of Jus-
tice—articulated a broadly unilateralist view of the power of 
one state to assert its regulatory authority over conduct occur-
ring beyond its borders.115 In The Case of the S.S. “Lotus,” a 
French sea captain had been arrested and charged in a Turkish 
court following a deadly collision at sea between the French 
captain’s ship and a Turkish ship, after which the French sea 
captain sailed his damaged ship into port in Turkey.116 Viewing 
the Turkish prosecution of the French sea captain as an in-
fringement on the sovereignty of a French-flag ship, France and 
Turkey agreed to have the matter heard by the PCIJ. The PCIJ 
was to determine whether Turkey had a basis in international 
law for subjecting the French sea captain to the Turkish legal 
process.117 The court concluded that Turkey was under no obli-
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.  
 114. See id. at 102 (“We cannot suppose that when Congress enacted the 
statute or amended it, it did not have in mind that a wide field for such frauds 
upon the Government was in private and public vessels of the United States 
on the high seas and in foreign ports and beyond the land jurisdiction of the 
United States, and therefore intended to include them in the section.”). 
 115. S.S. “Lotus” (Fr./Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 25–
33 (Sept. 7). 
 116. Id. at 10. 
 117. Id. at 5. 
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gation in the first instance to justify its assertion of jurisdic-
tion; instead, the burden fell on France to explain how interna-
tional law forbade Turkey from asserting jurisdiction over a 
French citizen in Turkish territory.118 The resulting rule—
commonly known as the “Lotus principle”—made clear that 
states may unilaterally and without affirmative justification 
assert their jurisdiction over conduct abroad, subject only to 
such prohibitory limits that other states might show to exist.119 
Back in the United States, the Supreme Court soon ruled 
on another exception to strict territoriality, this time to make 
clear the authority of the United States to subject its own citi-
zenry to certain obligations of U.S. law even when they ven-
tured abroad. In Blackmer v. United States, the Court ruled 
that a U.S. citizen could be required to comply with a subpoena 
requiring his return from France to testify in a U.S. criminal 
court proceeding.120 “By virtue of the obligations of citizenship,” 
the Court explained, “the United States retained its authority 
over him, and he was bound by its laws made applicable to him 
in a foreign country.”121  
It was not long before the jurisdictional focus more explicit-
ly shifted from considering where troublesome acts occurred to 
where those acts ended up having their effects. As Professor 
Kal Raustiala has suggested, “[t]he conceptual evolution was 
one of ‘territorial commission,’ morphing into ‘territorial securi-
ty,’” such that “[t]he act became less important than the ef-
fect.”122 In 1945, Judge Learned Hand of the Second Circuit is-
sued the landmark ruling that embraced the “effects principle” 
in United States v. Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa), a 
case involving claims against Alcoa for global monopolistic 
business practices.123 Among the many issues in the case was 
 
 118. Id. at 25–26, 31. 
 119. Id. at 19 (“Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect 
that States may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of 
their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, [international 
law] leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is only lim-
ited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State 
remains free to adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable.”).  
 120. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438–40 (1932). 
 121. Id. at 436. 
 122. RAUSTIALA, supra note 7, at 180. 
 123. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 421 (2d 
Cir. 1945). The case was certified to the Second Circuit for decision by the Su-
preme Court because of the lack of a quorum of nonrecused justices to decide 
the matter. The Supreme Court would later cite and expressly approve of the 
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whether U.S. antitrust laws should apply to agreements made 
abroad by a group of foreign aluminum companies that were 
associated with Alcoa and that restricted aluminum production 
in a manner that could affect U.S. markets.124 Framing the in-
quiry as one of Congress’s presumed intent concerning the geo-
graphical scope of the antitrust law’s coverage, Judge Hand  
foreswore attributing to Congress an intent to regulate foreign-
based conduct that had no effect at home: “We should not im-
pute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its courts can 
catch, for conduct which has no consequences within the United 
States.”125 But still, Judge Hand noted, “it is settled law 
. . . that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not 
within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has 
consequences within its borders which the state reprehends.”126  
Several years after Alcoa, the Supreme Court was con-
fronted in 1952 with whether the trademark protections of the 
Lanham Act should be extraterritorially applied to forbid a 
U.S. citizen from stamping and selling watches in Mexico with 
a brand name that had trademark protection under U.S., but 
not Mexican, law. The Court decided in Steele v. Bulova Watch 
Co. to apply the Lanham Act extraterritorially because the al-
legedly unlawful conduct had “some effects” within the United 
States and because of the Lanham Act’s “broad jurisdictional” 
reach to “‘all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by 
Congress.’”127 The Court distinguished American Banana on 
the ground that “the holding in that case was not meant to con-
fer blanket immunity on trade practices which radiate unlawful 
consequences here, merely because they were initiated or con-
summated outside the territorial limits of the United States.”128 
The Court added that “[u]nlawful effects in this country, absent 
in the posture of the Banana case before us, are often deci-
sive.”129  
 
Alcoa decision’s extraterritorial application of antitrust law. F. Hoffmann-La 
Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004). 
 124. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 442–45 (describing Alcoa’s 1931 and 1936 produc-
tion quota agreements). 
 125. Id. at 443. 
 126. Id.; see also United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1, 8–9 
(1st Cir. 1997) (holding that a criminal conviction for a Sherman Act conspira-
cy may be based solely on conduct in Japan that was intended to and caused 
effects inside the United States). 
 127. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 252 (1991) (describing 
and quoting Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285, 287 (1952)).  
 128. Steele, 344 U.S. at 288. 
 129. Id.  
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Nevertheless, with the “effects” doctrine now firmly rooted 
after Alcoa as a basis for applying U.S. law to acts in foreign 
countries, “territoriality’s heyday was over.”130 Yet the question 
of what should be done when U.S. law clashed with the law of 
the foreign state where the acts took place remained unan-
swered. Rather than giving guidance for any conflict that might 
result from extending U.S. law abroad, Alcoa simply provided a 
unilateralist enabling principle for the effects doctrine.131  
Following Alcoa, lower courts and commentators during 
the 1970s and 1980s grappled with whether effects-based 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law should be tempered by 
the countervailing interests of foreign states in applying their 
own law to acts within their own territory.132 This was the start 
of a judicial interests-balancing approach. Borrowing in part 
from principles of international comity and domestic conflict-of-
laws doctrine, this burgeoning approach suggested that U.S. 
law might not apply abroad if it would not be reasonable to do 
so. A balancing of U.S. and foreign interests in regulating the 
same conduct determined what was reasonable. Some courts 
advanced multiple factors, including not only the degree of con-
flict between U.S. law and foreign law, but also the nationality 
and location of the parties, the expected efficacy of both states’ 
policies, the relative effects on the United States of the foreign 
conduct, the degree to which the foreign conduct was intended 
to or would foreseeably harm the United States, and the rela-
 
 130. Parrish, Effects Test, supra note 28, at 1467; see also Lowenfeld, supra 
note 35, at 47 (noting that “the U.S. Supreme Court takes the effects doctrine 
for granted,” and there is “no doubt that a [nation] state may apply its law—
i.e., exercise its jurisdiction to prescribe—on the basis of effects caused by the 
challenged activity in its territory, even when no part of the activity was car-
ried out in its territory”). 
 131. Buxbaum, Territory, supra note 2, at 645 (“Thus, in Alcoa itself, con-
flicts law appears less to provide a limitation on the reach of U.S. laws than to 
articulate an enabling principle: conflicts law recognizes jurisdiction based on 
acts that occur elsewhere.”); Kramer, Vestiges of Beale, supra note 53, at 193 
(“Alcoa thus did precisely what the territorial principle was designed to pre-
vent: create conflicts with foreign nations that caused tensions in internation-
al relations.”). 
 132. “It is a settled principle of international and our domestic law that a 
court may abstain from exercising enforcement jurisdiction when the extrater-
ritorial effect of a particular remedy is so disproportionate to harm within the 
United States as to offend principles of comity.” Consol. Gold Fields PLC v. 
Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 263 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Mannington Mills, 
Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1294 (3d Cir. 1979); Timberlane 
Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 609 (9th Cir. 1976); Buxbaum, Ter-
ritory, supra note 2, at 646–50 (describing cases and commentary). 
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tive importance of any conduct that occurred in the United 
States that was associated with the foreign conduct at issue.133  
In 1993, however, the Supreme Court took a dim view of 
broad interests balancing when confronted with its next major 
case involving extraterritorial application of U.S. law. In Hart-
ford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, the Court considered 
whether principles of international comity should belay appli-
cation of the Sherman Act to British reinsurance companies 
that allegedly conspired in the United Kingdom to affect the 
U.S. insurance market in an anticompetitive way.134 The stick-
ing point was that the British companies’ conduct was not il-
legal under the law of the United Kingdom where their acts 
took place.135 The Court declined to curb the Sherman Act, 
deeming there to be no “true conflict” between British and U.S. 
law in the sense that the British companies could still comply 
with U.S. law without putting themselves in violation of British 
law.136 
The decision in Hartford Fire thus embraced a highly re-
strictive vision of comity and interests balancing in general—a 
vision largely consistent with the judicial unilateralist school. 
It allowed for displacement of U.S. extraterritorial regulation 
only in cases of a “true conflict” between laws—only if U.S. law 
required actors to violate foreign law. If U.S. law was otherwise 
inconsistent with foreign law (such as by adding regulation 
where foreign law had none or regulating to a degree that for-
eign law did not), then U.S. law would still apply. As the Court 
explained, “‘the fact that conduct is lawful in the state in which 
it took place will not, of itself, bar application of the United 
States antitrust laws,’ even where the foreign state has a 
strong policy to permit or encourage such conduct.”137 The 
Court added that “[n]o conflict exists, for these purposes, 
‘where a person subject to regulation by two states can comply 
with the laws of both.’”138 
 
 133. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614 (listing factors); see also Mannington 
Mills, 595 F.2d at 1297–98 (similar list of ten factors). But see Laker Airways 
v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 948–50 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (de-
clining to engage in interests balancing as suggested in Timberlane and Man-
nington Mills). 
 134. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 769–70 (1993). 
 135. Id. at 798–99. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 415 cmt. j). 
 138. Id. at 799 (quoting RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 403 cmt. e); see also 
Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws: A Postscript 
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More recently, the Court reaffirmed Hartford Fire, while 
also making clear that the effects doctrine could not justify reg-
ulating foreign-based conduct that does not in fact affect the 
U.S. market. In F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 
the Court in 2004 again considered the foreign application of 
the Sherman Act, this time in a case involving allegations of a 
price-fixing conspiracy among foreign and domestic vitamin 
companies.139 Without questioning the appropriateness of ap-
plying U.S. law to foreign-based conduct that actually causes 
effects inside the United States, the Court declined to apply an-
titrust law to segregable foreign-based conduct that affected on-
ly other foreign markets.140 Writing for the Court, Justice 
Breyer rhetorically queried: “Why should American law sup-
plant, for example, Canada’s or Great Britain’s or Japan’s own 
determination about how best to protect Canadian or British or 
Japanese customers from anticompetitive conduct engaged in 
significant part by Canadian or British or Japanese or other 
foreign companies?”141 Answering this question, Justice Breyer 
noted that “where foreign injury is independent of domestic ef-
fects, Congress might have hoped that America’s antitrust laws 
. . . would commend themselves to other nations as well,” but 
that “if America’s antitrust policies could not win their own 
way in the international marketplace for such ideas, Congress, 
we must assume, would not have tried to impose them, in an 
act of legal imperialism, through legislative fiat.”142 
Outside the antitrust context, the Court has frequently in-
voked a presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. 
statutes. In Foley Bros. v. Filardo, the Court in 1949 declined to 
apply a U.S. eight-hour labor law to constrain the employment 
of a U.S. citizen by a U.S. company on public works projects in 
Iraq and Iran.143 Decades later, the Court would rely on Foley 
in 1991 to conclude in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. that 
the antidiscrimination protections of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 did not protect a U.S. employee of a U.S. 
company in Saudi Arabia.144 In the last twenty years, the Court 
 
on Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 213, 220–29 
(1993) (making an extensive critique of Hartford Fire’s restrictive approach). 
 139. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 159 (2004). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 165. 
 142. Id. at 169. 
 143. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284–85 (1949).  
 144. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 246–47 (1991). Congress 
quickly amended Title VII to provide for its limited extraterritorial application 
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has cited or relied on the presumption to limit extraterritorial 
application of federal patent law,145 federal criminal firearms 
law,146 federal immigration law,147 and the Federal Tort Claims 
Act.148  
Most recently, the Court in 2010 ringingly reaffirmed the 
presumption against extraterritoriality in Morrison v. National 
Australia Bank Ltd. In that case, the Court concluded that the 
principal antifraud provision of the federal securities laws did 
not apply extraterritorially to securities transactions in Aus-
tralia, despite the fact that certain conduct that was alleged to 
have made the Australian transactions fraudulent occurred in 
the United States.149 For lack of any “clear indication”150 in the 
statute that the antifraud provision was meant to apply to for-
eign securities transactions, the Court concluded “that the fo-
cus of the [Securities Exchange Act of 1934] is not upon the 
place where the description originated, but upon purchases and 
sales of securities in the United States.”151 The Court repu-
diated a long line of lower court rulings that had looked to what 
was “reasonable” and “what Congress would have wanted” and 
that had applied the antifraud law to foreign securities trans-
actions stemming from “significant conduct in the United 
States” or causing “some effect on American securities markets 
or investors.”152 
 
to U.S. employees of U.S. companies, provided that U.S. companies are not 
barred from complying with U.S. law. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(f ), 2000e-1(a)–(c) 
(2006).  
 145. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454–55 (2007) (hold-
ing that federal patent law is not applicable to software installation in foreign 
countries). 
 146. Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 394 (2005) (holding that federal 
felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm law is not applicable when felon’s conviction is 
obtained in a foreign court). 
 147. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173–74 (1993) (hold-
ing that a federal immigration law prohibition on the return of refugees to 
countries where they could face persecution is not applicable to Haitian refu-
gees interdicted on the high seas outside of U.S. territorial waters). 
 148. Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 203–04 (1993) (holding that the 
Federal Tort Claims Act is not applicable to tortious conduct in Antarctica). 
 149. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010) (in-
terpreting the scope of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
and of Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder). 
 150. Id. at 2878 (requiring “clear indication”); id. at 2883 (requiring “clear 
indication” in consideration of the entire statute and “context,” but not neces-
sarily a “clear statement” in the statutory text itself ). 
 151. Id. at 2884.  
 152. Id. at 2878–79 (describing and criticizing the longstanding approach of 
the Second Circuit and its “conduct” and “effects” tests).  
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2. Customary Law of International Jurisdiction 
The customary law of international jurisdiction recognizes 
the bases and authority of sovereign states to prescribe, adjudi-
cate, and enforce rules of law and also to resolve competing 
claims of more than one state about the power to regulate the 
same conduct or persons.153 Although Congress is not bound by 
the confines of international law,154 the customary law of inter-
national jurisdiction is not merely of academic concern. The 
Supreme Court has long presumed, under the “Charming Bet-
sy” canon of statutory construction, that an act of Congress 
should not be read to violate international law if the statute is 
ambiguous and another interpretation of the statute is possi-
ble.155 As the Court has noted, “[t]his rule of statutory construc-
tion cautions courts to assume that legislators take account of 
the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations when they 
write American laws.”156 Accordingly, a primary consideration 
for U.S. courts when deciding whether to apply a geoambiguous 
law abroad is whether it would be consistent with the custom-
ary international law of jurisdiction.157  
The Restatement identifies four prima facie grounds for a 
nation-state’s assertion of power to prescribe its law: (1) terri-
torial jurisdiction—the regulating state’s interest in governing 
conduct occurring in its own territory or, relatedly, conduct 
 
 153. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, pt. IV, introductory note, § 401; see 
also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (noting that “[t]here is, however, a type of ‘jurisdiction’ relevant to 
determining the extraterritorial reach of a statute; it is known as ‘legislative 
jurisdiction,’ or ‘jurisdiction to prescribe,’” which refers to “‘the authority of a 
state to make its law applicable to persons or activities,’ and is quite a sepa-
rate matter from ‘jurisdiction to adjudicate’” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 154. See supra notes 58–66 and accompanying text. 
 155. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) 
(“[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations 
if any other possible construction remains.”). The Supreme Court “ordinarily 
construes ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the so-
vereign authority of other nations,” and “[t]his rule of construction reflects 
principles of customary international law—law that (we must assume) Con-
gress ordinarily seeks to follow.” F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran 
S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004). 
 156. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164. 
 157. For some kinds of maritime crimes, Congress has explicitly instructed 
U.S. courts to assert jurisdiction only “[t]o the extent permitted by interna-
tional law.” 18 U.S.C. § 7(8) (2006) (defining “special maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States” to include, “[t]o the extent permitted by in-
ternational law, any foreign vessel during a voyage having a scheduled depar-
ture from or arrival in the United States with respect to an offense committed 
by or against a national of the United States”). 
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outside its territory that has or is intended to have a substan-
tial effect inside its territory;158 (2) nationality jurisdiction—the 
regulating state’s interest in governing conduct of its own na-
tionals wherever they may be located;159 (3) passive personality 
jurisdiction—the regulating state’s interest in governing con-
duct taken against or harming its nationals;160 and (4) protec-
tive jurisdiction—the regulating state’s interest in governing 
conduct that threatens its security or essential government 
functions.161 
In addition to these four primary grounds for prescriptive 
jurisdiction, the Restatement suggests that each state may as-
sert universal jurisdiction over certain horrific crimes—that is, 
“to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recog-
nized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such 
as piracy, the slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, 
 
 158. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 402(1). The term “subjective territorial-
ity” is commonly used to refer to a state’s authority “over acts that occur—
even in part—within its territory,” and the term “objective territoriality” refers 
to acts that “may not occur but have an effect within its territory.” Anthony J. 
Colangelo, The Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 149, 
159 (2006) [hereinafter Colangelo, Legal Limits].  
 159. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 402(2); see also United States v. Clark, 
435 F.3d 1100, 1106 (9th Cir. 2006) (ruling that a federal statute criminalizing 
a U.S. citizen’s involvement in child sex in Cambodia is consistent with the 
“nationality” principle of international jurisdiction); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sa-
bena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that 
“[t]he citizenship of an individual or nationality of a corporation has long been 
a recognized basis which will support the exercise of jurisdiction by a state 
over persons,” and that “a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law governing the 
conduct of its nationals whether the conduct takes place inside or outside the 
territory of the state”). 
 160. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 402(2); see also id. cmt. g (commenting 
that “[t]he passive personality principle” is not “generally accepted for ordi-
nary torts or crimes, but it is increasingly accepted as applied to terrorist and 
other organized attacks on a state’s nationals by reason of their nationality”); 
Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 323, 323 n.4 (2001) (noting the “substantial debate and uncertainty concern-
ing the legitimacy of the passive personality category,” but that “this category 
has become increasingly accepted in recent years for certain kinds of conduct, 
such as terrorism”). 
 161. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 402(3); see also id. cmt. f (noting appli-
cation of “the protective principle” not only to “offenses directed against the 
security of the state” but also “other offenses threatening the integrity of 
governmental functions . . . e.g., espionage, counterfeiting of the state’s seal or 
currency, falsification of official documents, as well as perjury before consular 
officials, and conspiracy to violate the immigration or customs laws”). The pro-
tective principle “refers to the safety and integrity of the state apparatus it-
self[,] . . . not its overall physical and moral well-being.” Kontorovich, supra 
note 65, at 1231. 
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genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism.”162 
An assertion of universal jurisdiction depends solely on the na-
ture of the alleged crime. In contrast to the other grounds for 
jurisdiction discussed above, universal jurisdiction requires no 
nexus at all between the acts in question and the territory, citi-
zenry, or government of the state asserting jurisdiction.163 
Moreover, universal jurisdiction may extend beyond criminal 
penalties to civil remedies for torts in violation of universal 
norms,164 and U.S. courts frequently entertain lawsuits seeking 
tort remedies for acts deemed universal crimes and torts.165 
In short, as Curtis Bradley has suggested, “[u]nless a na-
tion’s extraterritorial law falls within one of five categories—
territoriality, nationality, protective principle, passive perso-
nality, or universality—it is said, the nation violates interna-
tional law rules governing ‘prescriptive jurisdiction.’”166 Be-
cause more than one state may lay claim under one or more of 
the criteria above to govern the same conduct, how should this 
competition be resolved? According to the Restatement, except 
for universal jurisdiction cases, a state should refrain from as-
serting prescriptive jurisdiction if to do so would be “unreason-
able” in light of the competing ties and interests of other states 
in regulating the actor or conduct at issue.167 Section 403 of the 
 
 162. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 404.  
 163. See id. cmt. a (“[I]nternational law permits any state to apply its laws 
to punish certain offenses although the state has no links of territory with the 
offense, or of nationality of the offender (or even the victim).”). 
 164. Id. cmt. b. 
 165. See, e.g., John B. Bellinger III, Enforcing Human Rights in U.S. 
Courts and Abroad: The Alien Tort Statute and Other Approaches, 42 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 2 (2009) (“[W]e are now quite frequently occupied domesti-
cally with suits by foreign plaintiffs in U.S. courts—often arising from conduct 
that occurred in other countries and has no significant connection to the U.S., 
that may not be consistent with our government policies for promoting human 
rights.”); see also cases cited infra note 226. 
 166. Bradley, supra note 160, at 323 (footnote omitted). 
 167. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 403 (describing “reasonableness” limi-
tations on prescriptive jurisdiction); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Califor-
nia, 509 U.S. 764, 818 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that “[u]nder 
the Restatement, a nation having some ‘basis’ for jurisdiction to prescribe law 
should nonetheless refrain from exercising that jurisdiction ‘with respect to a 
person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise of 
such jurisdiction is unreasonable,’” and then listing “reasonableness” factors 
(quoting RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 403)). But see Bradley, supra note 160, 
at 324 n.5 (“There has been some debate over whether international law in 
fact imposes a reasonableness limitation.”). Although the Restatement’s “rea-
sonableness” factors of section 403 are said to apply only to the first four 
grounds for prescriptive jurisdiction of section 402, it is not clear why the 
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Restatement sets forth a long list of reasonableness factors, in-
cluding “the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating 
state”; other “connections” between the regulating state and the 
activity; the “importance” of the regulation to the regulating 
state as well as to “the international political, legal, or econom-
ic system”; the “existence of justified expectations that might be 
protected or hurt by the regulation”; and “the likelihood of con-
flict with regulation by another state.”168 Many of these inter-
ests-balancing factors are redundant of the prima facie jurisdic-
tional factors listed above, and the Restatement does not 
furnish further guidance about how to reconcile competing ju-
risdictional claims.  
By advancing an open-ended, interests-balancing ap-
proach, the Restatement strives to diminish the role of tradi-
tional territorial jurisdiction. Although acknowledging territo-
riality as one of the primary grounds for the exercise of 
prescriptive jurisdiction, the Restatement’s commentary cha-
racterizes territoriality as a product of excessive formalism and 
outmoded concerns about individual nation-state sovereign-
ty.169 The commentary goes on to dismiss reliance on “rigid” 
territoriality and nationality concepts to control the outcome of 
a jurisdictional conflict. It notes that “[t]erritoriality and na-
tionality remain the principal bases of jurisdiction to prescribe, 
but in determining their meaning rigid concepts have been re-
placed by broader criteria embracing principles of reasonable-
ness and fairness to accommodate overlapping or conflicting in-
terests of states, and affected private interests.”170  
To the same effect, the Restatement acknowledges that 
territoriality may “generally justif[y] the exercise of jurisdiction 
to prescribe,” but then cautions that “not all activities within a 
state’s territory . . . may reasonably be subjected to its legisla-
tion.”171 It accepts territoriality as merely the “normal” basis 
for the exercise of jurisdiction, while insisting that “in some 
 
same reasonableness concerns would not come into play in cases of competing 
claims to redress a violation of international law warranting the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction. 
 168. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 403(2); see also Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. 
at 818–19 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (listing several reasonableness factors). 
 169. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, pt. IV, ch. 1, subch. A, introductory note, 
(“In the past, the jurisdiction of a state to make its law applicable in a trans-
national context was determined by formal criteria supposedly derived from 
concepts of state sovereignty and power.”). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. § 402 cmt. a.  
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situations” it may be that both territoriality and nationality 
must exist to make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable.172 In 
short, the Restatement displaces territoriality with multi-factor 
reasonableness as the dispositive criteria for deciding what ac-
tivities states have the power to regulate even within their own 
borders. 
Just as the Restatement demotes territorial jurisdiction, it 
strives to legitimate the effects-jurisdictional principle by 
deeming it no less than “an aspect of . . . territoriality,” rather 
than by categorizing it as a distinct form of extraterritorial ju-
risdiction.173 The Restatement casts territorial jurisdiction to 
include not only a state’s power to regulate conduct within its 
territory, but also a state’s power to regulate any extraterri-
torial conduct that has or is merely intended to have a substan-
tial effect within the state’s territory.174 The protective prin-
ciple in turn is classified as “a special application of the effects 
principle,” such that invoking the effects or protective prin-
ciples of jurisdiction becomes the equivalent of asserting terri-
torial jurisdiction.175 In short, the Restatement undermines 
territoriality while, ironically, legitimating the effects and pro-
tective principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction by equating 
them with territoriality.176  
What explains the Restatement’s attack on territoriality? 
It is best understood not only in light of the tide of Supreme 
Court cases discussed above, but also in light of the general in-
terest of the United States to apply its law abroad. As Professor 
Raustiala has noted, “American notions and doctrines of terri-
toriality were themselves drawn from international law,” but 
 
 172. Id. cmt. b (commenting that “[t]erritoriality is considered the normal, 
and nationality an exceptional, basis for the exercise of jurisdiction,” and that 
“[i]n some situations the existence of both links may be important to make the 
exercise of jurisdiction reasonable”). 
 173. Id. cmt. d (describing the “[e]ffects principle” as “an aspect of jurisdiction 
based on territoriality, although it is sometimes viewed as a distinct category”). 
 174. See id. § 402(1) (noting that a state has “jurisdiction to prescribe law 
with respect to (1)(a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place 
within its territory; (b) the status of persons, or interests in things present 
within its territory; (c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to 
have substantial effect within its territory”) (emphasis added).  
 175. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 402 cmt. f (“The protective principle 
may be seen as a special application of the effects principle . . . but it has been 
treated as an independent basis of jurisdiction.”). 
 176. Cf. Parrish, Effects Test, supra note 28, at 1482 (“[T]he effects test de-
stroys territorial restraints while simultaneously reaffirming the necessity of 
territoriality as a means of determining jurisdiction.”). 
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“these notions and doctrines evolved over time to reflect Ameri-
can national interests.”177 And thus, “in practice territoriality 
has neither been static nor treated as a given,” but “has been 
stretched and pulled over time in an effort to achieve national 
ends within the existing international order.”178 
This Article has defined the distinction between territorial 
and extraterritorial regulation to depend on the location of the 
human act or conduct that is actually subject to regulation, ra-
ther than the location of the effect of such an act or even the in-
tent of the regulator to affect extraterritorial conduct. This dis-
tinction highlights the frequency with which Congress enacts 
geoambiguous laws, leaving it to judges to decide whether they 
should apply such laws to extraterritorial conduct. Judges over 
time have departed from principles of strict territoriality to 
broad principles of extraterritoriality, although recurring ten-
sion remains between judges’ invocations of a presumption 
against extraterritoriality and their application of extraterrito-
riality doctrines such as the effects principle.179 This outline of 
the basic predicates of the customary international law of pre-
scriptive jurisdiction, as set forth in the Restatement, reveals 
its allowance for certain kinds of extraterritorial regulation, 
even if misleadingly described as variants of territorial jurisdic-
tion. The next Part identifies problems with the current 
framework used by U.S. courts to decide the extraterritorial 
scope of geoambiguous laws. 
II.  PROBLEMS WITH THE U.S. EXTRATERRITORIAL 
JURISDICTION FRAMEWORK   
The current framework for U.S. courts to interpret the 
extraterritorial scope of geoambiguous laws is problematic in 
several respects. As an initial matter, it is far from clear what 
must exist for the presumption against extraterritoriality to be 
overcome and what should be the consequence of the presump-
tion being overcome. Although insisting on a need for a clear 
showing of congressional intent to apply its law abroad, the 
 
 177. RAUSTIALA, supra note 7, at 7. 
 178. Id.; see also Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: Inter-
national Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1793 
(2009) (“[T]he content of international law often reflects the interests of power-
ful states. . . . [T]o the extent that international law diverges from those inter-
ests, powerful states often interpret it away or ignore it.”). 
 179. See Parrish, Effects Test, supra note 28, at 1474–76 (discussing the 
evolution of the effects test and the presumption against extraterritoriality 
and the conflicting nature of these judicial tools). 
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courts in practice sometimes follow the judicial unilateralist 
approach to allow extraterritorial application of U.S. law with-
out explicit support in the text of the statute or legislative his-
tory.180 As Professor Dodge contends, “the presumption should 
not be considered a clear statement rule and should be deemed 
rebutted when there is good reason to think that Congress was 
focused on something other than domestic conditions.”181 This 
means, to the dismay of judicial territorialists like Professor 
Parrish, that “the effects test is embraced as a way to reverse 
the presumption against extraterritoriality,” such that a “court 
presumes that Congress intended to regulate whenever harm 
(an effect) is felt in the United States, because surely Congress 
would wish to deter conduct causing harm and provide redress 
for past harm.”182  
Moreover, even when the presumption against extraterri-
toriality is overcome, it is unclear what this means. If the pre-
sumption is overcome, should U.S. law automatically apply 
with full force extraterritorially? Or should courts still perform 
interests balancing or consider other factors to decide if U.S. 
law should apply abroad? Thus, as Professor Edward Swaine 
has noted, the presumption against extraterritoriality is “quite 
 
 180. See, e.g., Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 310 (1970) 
(holding that the Jones Act applies extraterritorially despite the Act’s general 
wording); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 288 (1952) (applying the 
Lanham Act extraterritorially); Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 732–
33 (1952) (ruling that the treason statute applies extraterritorially); Ford v. 
United States, 273 U.S. 593, 602 (1927) (concluding that the National Prohibi-
tion Act applies extraterritorially to the high seas). 
 181. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption, supra note 54, at 90–91; see 
also id. at 87 (criticizing the Supreme Court in Hartford Fire for failing even 
to mention the presumption against extraterritoriality when considering the 
extension of U.S. antitrust law to Britain). 
 182. Parrish, Effects Test, supra note 28, at 1479; see also Sale v. Haitian 
Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 206 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (com-
menting that, despite the presumption against extraterritoriality, a wide 
range of laws are often applied extraterritorially, even in an expressed intent 
of Congress to that effect); Tamari v. Bache & Co., 730 F.2d 1103, 1107 n.11, 
1108 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that “[u]nder the effects test, courts have looked 
to whether conduct occurring in foreign countries had caused foreseeable and 
substantial harm to interests in the United States,” that “[t]he underlying 
theory is that Congress would have wished domestic markets and domestic 
investors to be protected from improper foreign transactions,” and that “courts 
have looked to the nature of the conduct or effects in the United States to de-
termine whether extraterritorial application would be consistent with the 
purposes underlying the statute”). 
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crude,” because when it is overcome, it “says very little about 
whether and how jurisdiction ought [to] be moderated.”183 
The presumption is also disingenuously agnostic about the 
relevance of any conflict between a U.S. law and a foreign law. 
On the one hand, the Court in Morrison declared that the “pre-
sumption applies regardless of whether there is a risk of con-
flict between the American statute and a foreign law.”184 Yet 
pages later the Court took pains to stress that “[t]he probability 
of incompatibility [of the securities anti-fraud law] with the ap-
plicable laws of other countries is so obvious that if Congress 
intended such foreign application ‘it would have addressed the 
subject of conflicts with foreign laws and procedures.’”185 The 
Court’s concern with justifying its result on the basis of a legal 
consideration that it had just deemed irrelevant is suggestive of 
its awareness of the presumption’s needless overbreadth to re-
strict the application of U.S. law in cases where no actual con-
flict ensues with foreign law.  
One could argue that these shortcomings of the presump-
tion are not significant, because, in cases of doubt about the 
presumption’s application, courts can look for guidance to 
background principles of the customary international law of 
prescriptive jurisdiction. But, as discussed in the following sec-
tions, this alternative is equally problematic, because custom-
ary jurisdictional principles are themselves lacking in prin-
cipled criteria for their application. First, the effects and 
protective jurisdictional principles are readily susceptible to 
misapplication because of the inherent difficulty in neutrally 
ascertaining what foreign conduct causes the requisite harm 
within the United States. Second, the Restatement’s interests-
balancing approach to the resolution of conflicts involving 
extraterritorial jurisdiction is not only unwieldy in its applica-
tion, but also inappropriately draws judges into substantive ba-
lancing of the interests of one country against another. Finally, 
the concept of universal jurisdiction does not have a clearly de-
fined scope with respect to the types of offenses and degree of 
an actor’s involvement in such offenses that are sufficient to 
warrant its invocation. Taken together, these doctrinal defi-
ciencies open the door too widely for the United States to apply 
 
 183. Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of Global Antitrust, 43 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 627, 713 (2001). 
 184. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877–78 (2010).  
 185. Id. at 2885 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256 
(1991)).  
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its law abroad and for other nation-states—perhaps unwelcom-
ingly—to regulate activities in the United States. Each of these 
problems with customary jurisdictional principles is discussed 
immediately below.  
A. PROBLEMS WITH THE EFFECTS AND PROTECTIVE PRINCIPLES 
The effects principle allows the United States to exercise 
prescriptive jurisdiction over “conduct outside its territory that 
has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territo-
ry.”186 In similar fashion, the protective principle—which the 
Restatement’s commentary deems to be “a special application 
of the effects principle”187—allows the United States to regulate 
“certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nation-
als that is directed against the security of the state or against a 
limited class of other state interests.”188 Both these tests in 
their application may end up virtually unbounded in scope. As 
Professor Paul Berman notes, “the growth of global communi-
cations technologies, the rise of multinational corporate entities 
with no significant territorial center of gravity, and the mobili-
ty of capital and people across borders mean that many juris-
dictions will feel effects of activities around the globe, leading 
inevitably to multiple assertions of legal authority over the 
same act, without regard to territorial location.”189 
As “everything affects everything,” the effects test can be 
applied breathtakingly broadly.190 As Professor Parrish has ob-
served, “[a]t its inception in the 1940s, the effects test had a  
limited impact,” but in the modern world the effects test “gives 
license for near universal jurisdiction.”191 Indeed, U.S. courts 
have suggested that the effects or protective principles should 
apply to wholly foreign activity—like drug trafficking 
schemes—that never end up touching the territory of the Unit-
 
 186. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 402(1)(c). 
 187. Id. § 402 cmt. f.  
 188. Id. § 402(3). 
 189. Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 1, at 1159; see also 
RAUSTIALA, supra note 7, at 117 (stating that “in an interdependent world, 
acts undertaken in one place frequently generated effects that spilled over into 
other nations around the globe,” and that “[t]he effects test in principle en-
compassed any imaginable spillover”). 
 190. Parrish, Effects Test, supra note 28, at 1479 (quoting 1 PHILLIP 
AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 255 (1978)).  
 191. Id. at 1478–79. 
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ed States.192 Because of its potential expanse, “the effects test 
has permitted precisely what [a theory of] legislative jurisdic-
tion is designed to prevent: conflicts with foreign states.”193 
Perhaps such criticism of the potential scope of the effects 
and protective principles might ring hollow if competing juris-
dictional grounds were equally manipulable. But in fact, the ef-
fects and protective principles are significantly more malleable 
in their application than their main counterparts—
territoriality and nationality grounds of jurisdiction. Territo-
riality requires a court to decide if a specific act that is subject 
 
 192. See, e.g., United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(“[A]pplication of the [Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act] to the defendants 
is consistent with the protective principle of international law because Con-
gress has determined that all drug trafficking aboard vessels threatens our 
nation’s security.”); United States v. Alomia-Riascos, 825 F.2d 769, 771 (4th 
Cir. 1987) (commenting that “[t]he protective principle of international law 
permits a nation to assert subject matter criminal jurisdiction over a person 
whose conduct outside the nation’s territory threatens the national interest,” 
and therefore that “under international law the United States could exercise 
criminal subject matter jurisdiction over foreign nationals for possession of 
large quantities of narcotics on foreign vessels upon the high seas, even in the 
absence of a treaty or arrangement”); United States v. Schmucker-Bula, 609 
F.2d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 1980) (affirming the conviction for extraterritorial con-
spiracy to import cocaine and stating that, “[l]ike the Fifth Circuit, we there-
fore might not be inclined to limit extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over 
aliens whose intended actions, if successful, would compromise this sovereign’s 
control of its own borders”); United States v. Manuel, 371 F. Supp. 2d 404, 
408–09 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that where leaders of a conspiracy knew that 
illegal drugs in Europe were intended for shipment to the United States, the 
U.S. drug trafficking statute, 21 U.S.C. § 841, allows the conviction of a drug 
dealer involved only in transporting drugs in Europe, despite the fact that the 
defendant did not know of or intend a U.S. destination). But see United States 
v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1162 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he notion that [the] ‘pro-
tective principle’ can be applied to ‘prohibiting foreigners on foreign ships 500 
miles offshore from possessing drugs that . . . might be bound for Canada, 
South America, or Zanzibar ’—as suggested by the Government here—has 
been repeatedly called into question by our Court and others.” (quoting United 
States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1988))); see also Kontorovich, supra 
note 65, at 1229–31 (discussing cases and contending that the protective prin-
ciple should not extend to offshore drug trafficking); Ellen S. Podgor & Daniel 
M. Filler, International Criminal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First Century: Re-
discovering United States v. Bowman, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 585, 589–92 
(2007) (criticizing lower courts’ expansive reading of the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Bowman to allow unwarranted extraterritorial application of U.S. law). 
 193. Parrish, Effects Test, supra note 28, at 1479; see also Ellen S. Podgor, 
“Defensive Territoriality”: A New Paradigm for the Prosecution of Extraterri-
torial Business Crimes, 31 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 25 (2002) (observing that 
“[h]istorically, the view taken was that absent specific language for extraterrito-
riality, the presumption was against permitting an extraterritorial prosecution,” 
but that “[w]hat was initially a presumption against extraterritoriality in crimi-
nal cases, however, has in fact become a reality of allowing extraterritoriality”). 
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to regulation took place within a state’s own territory.194 For 
example, did someone on U.S. territory hit the “send” button to 
launch a computer virus or instruct a colleague to pay a bribe? 
Nationality requires a court to decide upon the citizenship or 
other fixed legal status or relationship to the United States.195 
Was the person who hit the “send” button or paid a bribe a U.S. 
citizen who has accepted the obligations of following U.S. law? 
Courts can usually apply these status-type inquiries into terri-
toriality and nationality without legitimate controversy about 
their scope.196 The underlying aspects of territory and citizen-
ship are ordinarily fixed and easily ascertainable by reference 
to settled law and public record documentation.197 John Doe is 
a U.S. citizen (nationality). His home in Idaho, where he sat 
down at his computer to unleash a global computer virus, is in 
part of the United States (territoriality).  
Moreover, the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction based on 
territoriality and nationality does not require for its jurisdic-
tional justification that judges assess the reason, purpose, or 
 
 194. Federal statutes often define the “United States” in fixed geographical 
terms. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 3121(e)(2) (2006) (according to the tax code, “[t]he 
term ‘United States’ when used in a geographical sense includes the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa”); 
42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-6(8) (2006) (according to the absentee-voting statute, 
“‘United States,’ where used in the territorial sense, means the several States, 
the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin 
Islands, and American Samoa”). 
 195. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or natural-
ized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of 
the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1401 
(2006) (defining the class of persons who are “nationals and citizens of the 
United States at birth” in immigration law). Most U.S. economic sanctions ap-
ply only to the activities of “United States persons” in their dealings with for-
eign targets of sanctions. The term “United States person” is typically defined 
in clear terms to include “any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, 
entity organized under the law of the United States (including foreign 
branches), or any person in the United States.” See Meyer, supra note 53, at 
925 (citing sanctions regulations). 
 196. Of course, rare exceptions can be cited, such as in recent litigation 
concerning the juridical and territorial status of the Guantánamo Bay navy 
base in Cuba where detainees of the war on terror have been housed. See, e.g., 
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 475 (2004) (addressing “whether the [federal] ha-
beas statute confers a right to judicial review of the legality of executive deten-
tion of aliens in a territory over which the United States exercises plenary and 
exclusive jurisdiction, but not ‘ultimate sovereignty’”); cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 
553 U.S. 723, 754–55 (2008) (addressing constitutional implications stemming 
from the U.S. exercise of de facto sovereignty over Guantánamo Bay). 
 197. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 402 cmts. c, e (discussing how the 
principles of territoriality and nationality are generally applied). 
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motive for regulation.198 Judges consider only who did some-
thing or where they did it. Unlike with the effects and protec-
tive principles, courts applying the territory or nationality 
principles need not explore or predict whether any given act 
caused, was intended to cause, or is likely to cause an effect 
somewhere else. And they need not decide what kinds of effects 
(once caused) rise to the level of “substantial” for purposes of 
the effects principle or what kind of harmful acts fall within the 
“limited class” of state interests said to be within the scope of 
the protective principle.199 In short, when invoking territorial 
or nationality jurisdiction, courts have far less natural latitude 
to import substantive value bias than when invoking the effects 
or protective jurisdiction principles. 
Indeed, the perils of this kind of effects/protective jurisdic-
tional jurisprudence are clear from the long line of U.S. court 
decisions involving state’s rights or federalism challenges to the 
regulatory authority of the U.S. federal government. These 
challenges often turn on Congress’s power under the Commerce 
Clause and whether an activity subject to federal regulation os-
tensibly has a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce be-
tween the U.S. states.200 As scholars of U.S. constitutional law 
well know, the courts almost always validate Congress’s regu-
latory authority, often on the basis of preposterously atten-
uated claims that any given activity occasions a “substantial ef-
fect” on commerce.201 Courts strain mightily to reach these 
results. For cases involving purely intrastate conduct (e.g., 
 
 198. Of course, a U.S. criminal law that regulates conduct in the United 
States may well appropriately be subject to challenge on non-prescriptive-
jurisdictional grounds (e.g., that it denies constitutional rights of free speech 
or due process or that it exceeds federalism limits on the power of the U.S. na-
tional government to regulate matters traditionally regulated by individual 
states of the United States). See RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 402 cmt. j.  
 199. See, e.g., Turley, supra note 26, at 645 (observing that “courts have 
suspiciously little trouble envisioning systemic, aggregate effects in antitrust 
and securities cases while concluding that employment and environmental 
disputes are largely aberrational or isolated in nature,” but that “[s]urely some 
environmental and employment cases [such as nuclear accidents or systematic 
discriminatory employment practices] present an aggregate domestic effect 
great enough to satisfy the effects doctrine”). 
 200. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (noting that 
“Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce,” “the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate 
commerce,” and “those activities having a substantial relation to interstate 
commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce” 
(citations omitted)).  
 201. Meyer, supra note 53, at 941–45. 
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growing wheat or marijuana for one’s own consumption at 
home), the courts label the activity as “economic” in nature and 
conclude that regulation of intrastate activity is derivatively 
necessary to a broader scheme of interstate market regula-
tion.202 If a court cannot plausibly label the regulated intrastate 
activity as economic or commercial in nature, the inquiry shifts 
to whether any objects or events associated with such noneco-
nomic activity have ties to interstate commerce. For example, 
courts let Congress prohibit a felon from possessing a gun, pro-
vided that the gun has previously crossed a state line, even if it 
did so without the felon’s involvement and by means of a per-
fectly lawful shipment by someone else many years before the 
felon’s later purely intrastate possession of the gun.203  
Similarly, courts let Congress prohibit purely intrastate 
possession or production of child pornography, not because the 
act of possession or production has any link to interstate activi-
ty, but merely because generic precursor materials, like a digi-
tal camera or blank photo paper, have previously crossed a 
state line before they got into someone’s home to be used for 
viewing or making pornographic images.204 Links like this are 
 
 202. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (rejecting the as-
applied challenge to federal law prohibiting the manufacture, distribution, or 
possession of marijuana to intrastate growers and users of marijuana for med-
icinal purposes, and concluding that “[w]hen Congress decides that the total 
incidence of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the 
entire class” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 
111, 130–32 (1942) (rejecting farmer ’s as-applied challenge to federal law pro-
hibiting growing of wheat on farm for subsistence consumption); Robert Scha-
piro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 257–58 
(discussing how for Commerce Clause cases “the distinction between commer-
cial and noncommercial activity is difficult to define and employ”); Maxwell L. 
Stearns, The New Commerce Clause Doctrine in Game Theoretical Perspective, 
60 VAND. L. REV. 1, 16–18 (2007) (summarizing the evolution of case law and 
the extension of Commerce Clause authority to regulate any part of a “class” of 
economic activity that in turn has an effect on interstate commerce). 
 203. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006); see, e.g., Scarborough v. United States, 
431 U.S. 563, 566–67 (1977) (affirming the felon-in-possession conviction on 
the basis of interstate travel of a firearm occurring possibly several years or 
more before the defendant’s possession and despite the lack of any connection 
between the felon’s possession and the firearm’s crossing of a state line); Unit-
ed States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 634–35 (10th Cir. 2006) (acknowledging the 
continuing validity of Scarborough in light of Lopez and more recent Com-
merce Clause cases, and affirming the conviction for intrastate possession by 
felon of a bulletproof vest on the basis of evidence that the vest the felon 
bought in Kansas had been manufactured in California). 
 204. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (2006) (proscribing the use of a minor for the 
production of a visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct “if that visual de-
piction was produced using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or 
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said to satisfy the “substantial effect” on commerce require-
ment. In the extraterritorial context, Congress might well crim-
inalize Go Fish, gin rummy, or other family card games if 
played with cards made in China and therefore deemed to 
create a “substantial effect” on foreign commerce.205 
Maybe this judicial acquiescence to domestic application of 
the Commerce Clause is not so troubling in the context of our 
highly developed domestic legal system. As dubious as the re-
sults may be, the courts stand ready to adjudicate and enforce 
 
transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by 
computer”); id. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (2006) (establishing criminal prohibition for 
the possession of “any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, computer 
disk, or any other material that contains an image of child pornography 
. . . that was produced using materials that have been mailed, or shipped or 
transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by 
computer”); see also, e.g., United States v. Betcher, 534 F.3d 820, 823–24 (8th 
Cir. 2008) (ruling that there was a substantial effect on interstate commerce 
from the intrastate production of child pornography where it was shown that 
an Olympus camera that had been manufactured in Indonesia was used by 
defendant to take pornographic photos); United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 
1276, 1282 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that although “[t]he Government did not 
attempt to demonstrate that the images either traveled in interstate com-
merce themselves or were produced with the intent that they would travel 
in interstate commerce,” proof of interstate commerce was sufficient on the 
basis of “evidence that some of the photographs were printed on Kodak paper 
that the developer in Florida received from New York and that some of the 
pictures were processed using equipment received from California and manu-
factured in Japan”); cf. United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 
2007) (concluding that defendant’s purely intrastate acts of promoting prosti-
tution “substantially affected” interstate commerce: “[E]ven though his actions 
occurred solely in Florida, [they] had the capacity when considered in the ag-
gregate with similar conduct by others, to frustrate Congress’s broader regula-
tion of interstate and foreign economic activity,” and his “use of hotels that 
served interstate travelers and distribution of condoms that traveled in inter-
state commerce are further evidence that Evans’s conduct substantially af-
fected interstate commerce”). 
 205. Professor Colangelo highlights a similar problem with gauging what is 
a “substantial effect” for purposes of considering whether extraterritorial ap-
plication of U.S. law may exceed Congress’s authority under the Foreign 
Commerce Clause. See Colangelo, Foreign Commerce Clause, supra note 65, at 
1027–43. He concludes that this issue should be resolved by reference to 
whether the law would exceed the prescriptive authority of Congress under 
international law, id. at 1033, which, of course, is the very inquiry that this 
Article suggests is difficult to resolve in a principled manner. As a further lim-
iting principle, Colangelo also contends that, because of the Foreign Commerce 
Clause’s scope being limited to the regulation of commerce “with” foreign na-
tions and not “among” them, the Foreign Commerce Clause should not, in gen-
eral, be construed in a manner that allows or presupposes the authority of 
Congress to regulate the international market “writ large.” Id. (“[A] compre-
hensive global regulatory power over international markets among the nations 
of the world is not within the scope of the [Foreign Commerce] Clause.”).  
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their judgments in particular cases. And when the courts stray 
too far, the democratic process of voting and electoral pressure 
may rein in an overbroad federal law on a regulatory matter 
best left to individual states. More broadly, the democratic 
process remains available (at least by law and theory, if not in 
actual practice) to change the Constitution and the scope of the 
Commerce Clause.  
Not so when U.S. law is applied abroad. The foreign tar-
gets of a U.S. extraterritorial law have little potential demo-
cratic redress. Foreign nationals may not vote in the United 
States.206 Foreign nationals may not make political contribu-
tions to U.S. political candidates or parties.207 Foreign nation-
als who are not diplomats or registered agents may not act on 
behalf of their governments to lobby U.S. government officials, 
and they face criminal penalties for failure to register as re-
quired by law.208 When U.S. law applies abroad, it is undemo-
cratic because law is imposed without the consent of those gov-
erned by it, and those so governed may well lack fair notice of 
what the law is.209 In short, extraterritorial laws “force foreign-
ers (i.e., those beyond the state’s territorial borders) to bear the 
costs of domestic regulation, even though they are nearly pow-
erless to change those regulations.”210  
Although judicial unilateralists favor expansive application 
of the effects principle on the ground that it will compensate for 
underregulation,211 this view does not adequately account for 
the fact that foreigners have little or no say in making the law 
that imposes costs on them. A greater amount of regulation 
may be the result of unilateral application of U.S. law abroad, 
but without the input of all parties affected there is little rea-
 
 206. See 18 U.S.C. § 611 (2006). 
 207. 2 U.S.C. § 441e(a) (2006) (codifying a prohibition on political contribu-
tions by foreign nationals); see also Foreign Nationals, FED. ELECTION 
COMMISSION (July 2003), http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/foreign_nat_ 
brochure.pdf (describing federal election law restraints on political activities of 
foreign nationals). 
 208. 18 U.S.C. § 951(a) (2006); see also United States v. Dumeisi, 424 F.3d 
566, 579 (7th Cir. 2005) (declining to uphold a First Amendment challenge to 
the application of an unregistered-foreign-agent law stemming from defen-
dant’s publication of a news article). 
 209. Mark B. Gibney, The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law: The 
Perversion of Democratic Governance, the Reversal of Institutional Roles, and 
the Imperative of Establishing Normative Principles, 19 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 297, 305–06 (1996); Parrish, Effects Test, supra note 28, at 1483–86. 
 210. Parrish, Effects Test, supra note 28, at 1484. 
 211. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
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son to suppose that whatever rule U.S. officials choose will be 
the most globally efficient and optimal solution. This casts sig-
nificant doubt on the contention that U.S. extraterritorialism is 
an appropriate response to redress systematic underregulation 
by other states.212  
B. PROBLEMS WITH INTERESTS-BALANCING REASONABLENESS 
In theory, any troubles with overbroad application of the 
effects or protective principles could be redressed by application 
of interests balancing, as some commentators and cases have 
suggested and section 403 of the Restatement has embraced as 
a “rule of reason.”213 But, the interests-balancing approach re-
 
 212. See Dodge, Extraterritoriality, supra note 21, at 105 (“[I]n the short 
run, judicial unilateralism corrects for failures in the legislative process that 
lead to underregulation in areas like antitrust.”). Professor Dodge acknowl-
edges that “[a] nation feeling the harmful effects of an activity will be inclined 
to prevent those harmful effects without taking into account the benefits of 
that activity that may be felt elsewhere.” Id. at 158. He suggests that this 
problem can be ameliorated by the likelihood that an aggressive unilateral as-
sertion of extraterritorial legal authority will provoke multilateral negotia-
tions to reach consensus on a compromise rule. Id. See also Elhauge, supra 
note 69, at 2242 (“[T]he default rule that is most likely to provoke internation-
al agreement is one that creates international discord requiring resolution.”). 
Without denying the possibility that aggressive extension of U.S. law abroad 
may prod some countries to the multilateral negotiating table and seems to 
have done so in the antitrust context, see id. at 2243, it seems equally likely 
across the full spectrum of lawmaking activities that aggressive extraterri-
torial application of U.S. law could prompt belligerency and countermeasures 
that stymie political agreement on a multilateral rule. See Parrish, Reclaim-
ing, supra note 1, at 871–72 (acknowledging the “enticing” and apparently 
“logical” idea that “conflict between states will spur negotiations and provide 
incentives to cooperate multilaterally,” but contending that “little empirical 
support exists to suggest that extraterritorial laws lead to greater cooperation” 
and further suggesting that the United States itself will often be an unwilling 
treaty partner so long as it may achieve similar ends by unilateral extraterri-
torial extension of its law). Moreover, even assuming that hardball, unilateral-
ist tactics catalyze multilateral negotiations, it is far from clear that the re-
sulting “consensus” will be one untainted by unequal bargaining power and by 
threat of the United States to impose its will unilaterally. 
 213. See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text. For present purposes, I 
do not wade into the debate about whether the Restatement’s “rule of reason,” 
interests-balancing approach is an aspect of discretionary comity or actually 
embodies a rule of customary international law. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 
6, § 403 cmt. a (stating that the rule of reason represents not only a “require-
ment of comity” but also a “rule of international law”). Compare Laker Air-
ways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 950 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (“[T]here is no evidence that interest balancing represents a rule of in-
ternational law.”), and Dodge, Extraterritoriality, supra note 21, at 139–40 
(contending that “international law does not require comparative interest ba-
lancing, the Restatement (Third)’s assertions to the contrary notwithstand-
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lies on an unwieldy list of no fewer than eight factors and is 
without guidance as to how one factor should be weighed 
against another.214 As Professor Larry Kramer notes, “balanc-
ing tends not to work so well in practice,” because “[t]he consid-
erations being weighed are usually imprecise enough to permit 
several answers, and to dictate none,” such that “there is no 
greater certainty about the correctness of particular out-
comes—only more uncertainty about what these outcomes are 
likely to be.”215  
More troubling, several of the Restatement’s factors invite 
courts to indulge their substantive policy preferences by requir-
ing them to assess “the importance of regulation to the regulat-
ing state”; determine “the degree to which the desirability of 
such regulation is generally accepted”; and find “the impor-
tance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or 
economic system.”216 As the D.C. Circuit observed in Laker 
Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, courts are “neither 
qualified to evaluate comparatively nor capable of properly bal-
ancing” the array of “purely political factors.”217 Born as crea-
tures of a domestic legal system, our national courts are accus-
tomed to “follow international law only to the extent it is not 
overridden by national law,” and they “inherently find it diffi-
 
ing.”), and Swaine, supra note 183, at 690–91, 697 (leaving open the possibili-
ty that “reasonableness” in general might be a principle of customary interna-
tional law, but noting the lack of evidence that Restatement section 403 was, 
as required for a rule of customary international law, “based on evidence of 
how states actually proceeded,” and thereby concluding “there is simply insuf-
ficient evidence” that the Restatement’s “factor-rich reasonableness norm” 
represents customary international law), with Alford, supra note 37, at 15 
(disputing Laker Airways’s claim that there is “no evidence” that the jurisdic-
tional rule of reason is a rule of international law).  
 214. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 403 cmt. b (stating that the factors are 
“not exhaustive” and that “[n]ot all considerations have the same importance” 
and, as such, “the weight to be given to any particular factor or group of fac-
tors depends on the circumstances”). 
 215. Kramer, Vestiges of Beale, supra note 53, at 221; see also Swaine, su-
pra note 183, at 689–90 (noting that the elaboration of multiple “factors for 
balancing may improve transparency, but not predictability,” as “individual 
factors will often point in different directions, placing a premium on the deci-
sion maker ’s judgment, and opposing parties will still be able to claim credibly 
that the test supports each of their positions”). 
 216. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 403(2)(c),(e). 
 217. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 949. Of course, Laker Airways predated 
the latest version of the Restatement, but its criticism was aimed at earlier 
iterations of the interests-balancing test. See supra notes 132–33 and accom-
panying text (discussing Timberlane and Mannington Mills).  
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cult neutrally to balance competing foreign interests.”218 Thus, 
reasonableness “analysis has not resulted in a significant num-
ber of conflict resolutions favoring a foreign jurisdiction,” be-
cause “when push comes to shove, the domestic forum is rarely 
unseated.”219  
To be sure, the interests-balancing criteria of section 403 
might well be useful as guideposts for legislators or policy mak-
ers when deciding whether to decree that U.S. law should apply 
extraterritorially. But when this balancing analysis is foisted 
upon judges, it undermines the appropriate role of courts as 
neutral interpreters of the law. Interests balancing has no 
proper role for U.S. courts in deciding the extraterritorial scope 
of geoambiguous laws.  
C. PROBLEMS WITH UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
Although the dangers are not nearly as great as with ef-
fects and protective jurisdiction, universal jurisdiction is also 
unduly susceptible to subjective manipulability that erodes the 
constancy and predictability that are valued by rules of alloca-
tion of legislative jurisdiction. It is, of course, hard to dispute 
that some crimes are worse than others and that the worst-of-
the-worst crimes—such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, slavery, and piracy—all need to be effectively prose-
cuted. But the full range of crimes subject to universal jurisdic-
tion remains open-ended and far from clear. The Restatement, 
for example, ambiguously suggests that universal jurisdiction 
may extend to “perhaps certain acts of terrorism.”220 Yet, the 
meaning of “certain acts of terrorism” is far from certain under 
U.S. law. Indeed, Congress has defined the “federal crime of 
terrorism” to incorporate by reference dozens of other federal 
crimes whenever committed in a manner “calculated to influ-
 
 218. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 951. 
 219. Id. at 950–51; see also Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private International 
Law, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 280, 317 (1982) (“The result of such interest balancing 
will usually reflect an understandable bias in favor of the forum’s policy, 
grounded in unsophisticated analysis, overt chauvinism, or erroneous percep-
tions of a constitutional duty to advance legislative policies described in broad 
language but designed primarily for use in a domestic context.”); Parrish, Ef-
fects Test, supra note 28, at 1477 & nn.120–21 (noting “significant questions 
exist as to whether courts are able to evaluate foreign interests meaningfully 
or to do so in a way that does not inevitably favor U.S. interests” and citing 
multiple similar critiques). 
 220. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 404. 
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ence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or 
coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct.”221 
The Restatement otherwise lists more definite examples of 
universal crimes—“piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking 
of aircraft, genocide, [and] war crimes”—but in doing so it also 
makes clear that this list is nonexhaustive and asserts that 
there is an “expanding class of universal offenses.”222 As Pro-
fessor Anthony Colangelo warns, “[t]he near future may por-
tend an increased rubric of universal crime that includes other 
characteristically transnational offenses which call out for a co-
operative response from states, such as sex or drug trafficking, 
or which threaten the very stability of the international system, 
such as nuclear arms smuggling.”223  
In any event, even assuming that the range of substantive 
crimes deemed subject to universal jurisdiction were static or 
readily definable, an additional area of manipulability arises 
from questions concerning whether jurisdiction for a universal 
crime should extend to inchoate or secondary liability conduct 
such as conspiracy, attempt, aiding and abetting, harboring, 
and accomplice- or accessory-after-the-fact. If universal juris-
diction lies for war crimes, does it also lie for mere conspiracy 
to commit war crimes? The Supreme Court has recently divided 
inconclusively on this question.224 If terrorism in general is a 
universal crime, is material support for terrorism—such as do-
nating money to a political group that supports terrorism—also 
a universal crime?225  
 
 221. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g) (Supp. II 2008) (listing dozens of crimes).  
 222. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 404 & cmt. a. 
 223. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits, supra note 62, at 130; cf. Abdullahi 
v. Pfizer, 562 F.3d 163, 183–84 (2d Cir. 2009) (recognizing that the prohibition 
of nonconsensual medical experimentation on human beings constituted a un-
iversally accepted norm of customary international law), cert. denied, 130 S. 
Ct. 3541 (2010); United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d 
Cir. 1993) (rejecting a due process claim relating to a conviction for narcotics 
trafficking on the high seas by concluding that “[i]nasmuch as the trafficking 
of narcotics is condemned universally by law-abiding nations, we see no reason 
to conclude that it is ‘fundamentally unfair ’ for Congress to provide for the 
punishment of persons apprehended with narcotics on the high seas”).  
 224. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 602–13 (2006) (plurality opinion) 
(concluding that conspiracy is not an offense under the international law of war). 
 225. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits, supra note 62, at 185–86 (stating 
that universal jurisdiction includes various U.S. federal terrorism crimes that 
have been outlawed by multilateral antiterrorism conventions, but adding that 
“U.S. code offenses that are not the subject of widely ratified international legal 
prohibitions like providing material assistance to, or receiving military train-
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More generally, the floodgates have opened in U.S. courts 
to human rights claims against multinational corporate defend-
ants charging them with varying degrees of accomplice in-
volvement with foreign regimes in severe human rights 
abuses.226 These cases turn not just upon whether the abuses at 
issue rise to the level of universal crimes, but also on the scope 
of secondary liability for those who did not directly perpetrate 
the abuses—whether corporate actors’ knowledge and associa-
tion with primary perpetrators of abuses is sufficient to permit 
corporate actors to be held liable.227  
 
ing from a foreign terrorist organization, are not—at least at the present stage 
of development of international law—universal crimes” (footnotes omitted)). 
 226. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 
F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009) (ruling that absent proof that a Canadian corporation 
provided substantial assistance to the government of the Sudan with the pur-
pose—not just knowledge—of aiding the government’s unlawful conduct, the 
Canadian corporation could not be held liable under the Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS) for aiding and abetting the Sudanese government’s violations of the in-
ternational norms prohibiting genocide, war crimes, and crimes against hu-
manity); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009) (involv-
ing allegations of corporate collaboration with Colombian paramilitary forces 
to murder and torture trade union leaders and employees); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 
550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (involving allegations of primary and 
secondary liability of a mining company for human rights abuses in Papua 
New Guinea); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 
2007) (ruling that aiding-and-abetting liability is permissible under the ATS 
to allow potential liability against companies associated with the apartheid 
regime of South Africa); Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 
F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005) (concerning a lawsuit by Guatemalan labor union-
ists against the owner of a Guatemalan banana plantation under the ATS and 
Torture Victim Protection Act claiming defendant’s participation in torture 
and other human rights violations). These cases have proceeded in U.S. courts 
in part under the ATS, which provides a U.S. court with subject matter juris-
diction over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation 
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
Although the Supreme Court has not expressly conditioned an action under 
the ATS upon an allegation of conduct constituting a universal crime, the 
Court has restricted the kind of international law violations amenable to an 
action under the ATS to the historically most clearly defined kinds of serious 
international law violations. See Sosa v. Alvarez Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731–
33 (2004) (holding that illegal detention for less than one day of a Mexican na-
tional in Mexico, allegedly at the instigation of the DEA, did not rise to the 
level of supporting a cause of action under the ATS); see also Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co., Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, 2010 WL 3611392, at *21 
(2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010) (holding that corporations may not be held liable under 
the ATS); Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 173 (“ATS claims may sometimes be brought 
against private actors, and not only state officials, when the tortious activities 
violate norms of ‘universal concern’ that are recognized to extend to the con-
duct of private parties—for example, slavery, genocide, and war crimes.” (cita-
tions omitted)). 
 227. See Chimène I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cas-
  
2010] DUAL ILLEGALITY 163 
 
These problems stem from the nature of universal jurisdic-
tion itself. It premises state authority to prescribe on a broadly 
defined and expanding type of crime, rather than on a far more 
definitionally stable concept such as territoriality or nationali-
ty. This results in deep uncertainty about exactly what conduct 
a U.S. court might deem a universal crime worthy of universal 
geographic coverage by extension of a geoambiguous U.S. law. 
On top of these uncertainties about what crimes qualify as 
universal and about secondary liability must be added a ques-
tion about what continuing value the customary international 
law of universal jurisdiction truly has as a reference point for 
U.S. courts to decide the extraterritorial application of U.S. 
law. Congress has already expressly provided for extraterri-
torial jurisdiction over the core crimes that the Restatement 
identifies as subject to universal jurisdiction (and in fact pro-
vided for extraterritorial jurisdiction over many other especial-
ly heinous crimes).228 And most nations of the world have 
joined multilateral conventions requiring the criminalization of 
the “core” universal offenses and imposing a duty to prosecute 
or extradite alleged offenders who are found within their bor-
ders.229  
Accordingly, for the worst-of-the-worst crimes, our courts 
have little need to resort to customary international law to jus-
tify their authority to apply a geoambiguous federal statute to 
extraterritorial conduct. A rogue state that declined to recog-
nize certain conduct as a crime would not be bound by any con-
trary multilateral convention that it did not ratify and would 
not, as a persistent objector, be bound by a claim of customary 
international law.230 
Professor Colangelo has persuasively argued that “a single 
State cannot unilaterally and subjectively determine what 
 
es, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 61, 62 (2008) (“A central unresolved question in ATS liti-
gation is what standards govern the liability of accomplices to international 
law violations, rather than direct perpetrators of those violations.”); Michael 
D. Ramsey, International Law Limits on Investor Liability in Human Rights 
Litigation, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271, 273 (2009) (“The idea that investors are 
indirectly responsible for international law violations of their host govern-
ments has little basis in nations’ practice—indeed, in its modern form it ap-
pears to be chiefly a U.S. phenomenon, and even in the United States it re-
mains controversial.”). 
 228. See infra Appendix pt. B.3 (listing federal universal crimes). 
 229. See, e.g., Colangelo, Legal Limits, supra note 158, at 169–82 (discuss-
ing major universal-crime treaties). 
 230. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 34, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331; RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 102 cmt. d. 
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crimes are within its universal jurisdiction,” that the scope of 
universal jurisdiction “is a matter of international, not nation-
al, law,” and that “when individual States wish to implement 
their universal jurisdiction through domestic legislation and 
enforce it in domestic courts, they are constrained to determine 
the crimes they adjudicate as the crimes are determined under 
international law.”231 True enough, it may well be that U.S. 
courts should conform their interpretation of universal jurisdic-
tion to the international law norm, but it does not follow that 
they must do so, because U.S. courts are simply not bound by 
customary international law limits on jurisdiction.232 Just as 
substantive legal differences about the full range of universal 
crimes remain at the international level, U.S. courts are still 
free in practice—by intention or even inadvertence—to inter-
pret the customary law of universal jurisdiction overbroadly as 
grounds to allow the extraterritorial extension of U.S. geoam-
biguous law. 
The current extraterritorial jurisdiction framework as ap-
plied by U.S. courts is problematic. The presumption against 
extraterritoriality is not only inconsistently invoked, but also is 
unclear in its meaning and what must be shown to overcome 
the presumption. The commonly cited principles of extraterri-
torial jurisdiction—including the effects, protective, and uni-
versal principles—can be applied in an unprincipled manner, 
and these difficulties are not adequately remedied by a multi-
factored interests-balancing approach. These concerns give rise 
to this Article’s proposal for a new rule of “dual illegality” as 
discussed in the next Part, below. 
III.  DUAL ILLEGALITY   
As noted above, when confronted with geoambiguous stat-
utes, U.S. courts readily recite the presumption against extra-
territoriality. They may, nevertheless, end up applying U.S. 
law abroad, even when Congress has not said they should do so. 
In line with the judicial unilateralist vision, U.S. courts have 
inconsistently applied the presumption against territoriality to 
give expression to ever-expanding theories of effects, protective, 
 
 231. Anthony J. Colangelo, Universal Jurisdiction as an International 
“False Conflict” of Laws, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 881, 890–91 (2009). 
 232. See supra notes 155–57 and accompanying text; see also United States 
v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 91 (2d Cir. 2003) (“United States law is not subordinate 
to customary international law or necessarily subordinate to treaty-based in-
ternational law and, in fact, may conflict with both.”). 
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and universal jurisdiction, while only occasionally tempering 
their interpretations with an interests-balancing inquiry into 
whether it would be reasonable for U.S. law to apply abroad.  
Instead of invoking a highly uncertain presumption 
against territoriality, U.S. courts should instead apply a dual-
illegality rule of interpretation as a limitation against overex-
tension of prima facie jurisdictional interests under the nation-
ality, effects, protective, or universal jurisdictional principles. 
Part III.A, below, describes the proposed dual-illegality rule, 
how it would work, and the reasons it is a better approach than 
the Supreme Court’s current approach. Part III.B responds to 
potential objections. 
A. THE DUAL-ILLEGALITY RULE 
A dual-illegality rule would presume that, unless Congress 
has said so, Congress does not intend its law to apply abroad in 
a manner that is inconsistent with the law of the place where 
the conduct occurred. How would courts apply this rule? First, 
for any geoambiguous statute, a court would consider whether 
the United States has a prima facie jurisdictional interest in 
extraterritorial application of the law, such as by means of the 
effects, protective, or universal jurisdictional principles. 
Second, if the court answers this question in the affirmative, 
then the court would apply the dual-illegality rule—it would 
apply the statute extraterritorially only if the conduct would be 
prohibited or similarly regulated in the territory where it oc-
curred.  
The dual-illegality rule would operate as a precautionary 
limitation to ward off the dangers described above of over-
expansive assertions of prima facie jurisdiction. For cases 
where the United States otherwise claims a prima facie inter-
est in regulating the conduct, the rule would presume that 
Congress intended its geoambiguous law to apply only if it is 
consistent with the law of the state where the conduct takes 
place. U.S. courts should not presume geoambiguous U.S. law 
to apply to conduct that is perfectly legal or not regulated in a 
foreign state where the conduct takes place.  
Consider, for example, a geoambiguous U.S. law that pro-
hibits disposal of toxic waste.233 A company in Canada dis-
 
 233. The principal U.S. hazardous waste laws are the Resource Conversa-
tion and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Both statutes prohibit 
unpermitted discharges of hazardous waste or releases of hazardous sub-
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charges chemicals into a river that flows south across the bor-
der and pollutes a lake in the United States. Should the U.S. 
law apply to these facts? The judicial unilateralists say “yes,” 
because the discharge in Canada caused substantial effects in 
the United States (regardless of whether the discharge was le-
gal under Canadian law).234 The judicial territorialists say “no” 
for lack of clear evidence that Congress intended the law to ap-
ply to discharges in other countries. The interests balancers say 
“maybe,” depending on such factors as the nationality of the de-
fendant and the overall importance (however defined) of the 
U.S. environmental regulation. The dual-illegality rule says 
“yes” because the discharge causes substantial effects in the 
United States and because Canada (like the United States) 
prohibits companies from releasing hazardous chemicals into 
rivers and lakes.235 
A dual-illegality rule would serve what the Supreme Court 
has said is the primary justification for the presumption 
against extraterritoriality—that is, “to protect against unin-
tended clashes between our laws and those of other nations 
which could result in international discord.”236 Indeed, the 
dual-illegality rule more precisely serves this function because 
the presumption against extraterritoriality overbroadly pre-
vents application of U.S. law to foreign-based conduct when 
there is no inconsistency at all between U.S. and foreign law.237 
True, the presumption against extraterritoriality has also been 
justified on grounds that Congress is presumed to legislate only 
 
stances but are geoambiguous. See Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. 
Supp. 668, 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that the RCRA is not extraterritorial 
in effect); Lee I. Raiken, Extraterritorial Application of RCRA: Is Its Exporta-
bility Going to Waste?, 12 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 573, 576 (1993) (arguing that Con-
gress intended RCRA to have extraterritorial effect but that courts have fru-
strated this objective). 
 234. See, e.g., Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1078–
79 (9th Cir. 2006) (ruling that the CERCLA could be applied to a Canadian 
company that disposed of heavy-metal slag waste in Canadian water that 
eventually contaminated a lake in the United States). 
 235. Libin Zhang, Comment, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 31 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 545, 558 (2007) (“[T]he facts in Pakootas support the 
application of CERCLA to the [Canadian factory] since the outcome would 
likely have been very similar under the British Columbian CERCLA-inspired 
environmental statutes.”). 
 236. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).  
 237. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877–78 (2010) (“The 
canon or presumption [against extraterritoriality] applies regardless of wheth-
er there is a risk of conflict between the American statute and a foreign law.”). 
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with “‘domestic concerns in mind.’”238 But this “domestic con-
cerns” rationale has no apparent application to cases where 
extraterritorial conduct creates domestic effects (“concerns”) or 
for the many geoambiguous statutes that expressly reference 
Congress’s power to regulate “foreign commerce.”239 
Although a dual-illegality rule would be a new approach to 
deciding the extraterritorial scope of U.S. statutes, it is far from 
a novel concept in U.S. practice and international law. A “dual 
criminality” requirement is a long-established and near-
universal requirement of international extradition treaties and 
other forms of international law enforcement cooperation be-
tween the United States and other countries.240 In the extradi-
tion context, a dual-criminality requirement prevents extradi-
tion of a defendant to a requesting state if the defendant is 
sought for conduct that is not a crime in both the requesting 
and requested states.241 The dual-criminality requirement 
 
 238. Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388–89 (2005) (quoting Smith v. 
United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993)) (stating that “[i]n determining the 
scope of the statutory phrase we find help in the ‘commonsense notion that Con-
gress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind,’” and that “[t]his 
notion has led the Court to adopt the legal presumption that Congress ordinarily 
intends its statutes to have domestic, not extraterritorial, application”). 
 239. See, e.g., Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 371–72 (2005) 
(commenting that because “the wire fraud statute punishes frauds executed ‘in 
interstate or foreign commerce,’” that “this is surely not a statute in which 
Congress had only ‘domestic concerns in mind’” (quotations omitted)); see also 
infra Appendix pt. C (listing of geoambiguous statutes). Professor Dodge un-
derscores the weakness of the “domestic concerns” rationale by suggesting that 
it outright justifies extraterritorial application of U.S. law: “Congress’ focus on 
domestic conditions does not mean that its legislation should be applied only 
to conduct that occurs within the United States.” Dodge, Understanding the 
Presumption, supra note 54, at 124. 
 240. See William V. Dunlap, Dual Criminality in Penal Transfer Treaties, 
29 VA. J. INT’L L. 813, 829 (1989) (“[D]ual criminality remains virtually uni-
versal in extradition, recognized by nearly every international extradition 
treaty, act of national implementing legislation, judicial opinion and scholarly 
commentary on the subject.” (footnotes omitted)); John G. Kester, Some Myths 
of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1459 (1988) (“A maxim of 
international law, and a standard provision in nearly every United States 
extradition treaty, is that extradition will not take place unless the offense 
charged is a crime in both the demanding and the requested country.”); see al-
so RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 476(1)(c) (stating that for most international 
agreements, extradition is not granted “if the offense with which [the defen-
dant] is charged or of which he has been convicted is not punishable as a se-
rious crime in both the requesting and the requested state”).  
 241. See Dunlap, supra note 240, at 829 (noting three common forms of 
“dual criminality” requirements, such that “(1) a treaty may contain a manda-
tory clause requiring the requested State to refuse an extradition request 
when the act giving rise to the request does not constitute an offense under its 
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“‘serves the most important function of ensuring that a person’s 
liberty is not restricted as a consequence of offences not recog-
nized as criminal by the requested State,’” and that “‘[t]he so-
cial conscience of a State is also not embarrassed by an obliga-
tion to extradite a person who would not, according to its own 
standards, be guilty of acts deserving punishment.’”242 Al-
though the United States has not deployed a dual-illegality rule 
to curb its assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction,243 some for-
eign states decline to criminalize extraterritorial conduct if the 
conduct is not also illegal in the state where it occurred.244  
 
laws; (2) a treaty by its terms may apply only to offenses chargeable in both 
States; or (3) a treaty may enumerate the offenses extraditable under the trea-
ty and list only those that are common to both States”); Daseul Kim, Note, 
“Perfectly Properly Triable” in the United States: Is Extradition a Real and 
Significant Threat to Foreign Antitrust Offenders?, 28 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 
583, 594 (2008) (discussing the common use of “open-ended” dual criminality 
clauses rather than clauses that enumerate specific offenses as extraditable, 
such that “[a] typical pure dual criminality clause defines extraditable offenses 
as ‘[a]n offense . . . [that] the conduct on which the offense is based is punisha-
ble under the laws in both States by deprivation of liberty for a period of one 
year or more or by a more severe penalty’” (quoting Extradition Treaty, U.S.-
U.K., art. 2, Mar. 31, 2003, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-23 (2003))). 
 242. Jonathan O. Hafen, International Extradition: Issues Arising Under 
the Dual Criminality Requirement, 1992 BYU L. REV. 191, 194 (quoting IVAN 
SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 137–38 (1971)).  
 243. One federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 546 (2006), comes close to imposing a 
dual-illegality requirement by specifying criminal penalties against any owner 
of a U.S. vessel who takes part in a scheme to smuggle merchandise into a for-
eign country, but only “if under the laws of such foreign government any 
penalty or forfeiture is provided for violation of the laws of the United States 
respecting the customs revenue.” See Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 374 (commenting 
that section 546 “provided for criminal enforcement of the customs laws of a 
foreign nation only when that nation has a reciprocal law criminalizing smug-
gling into the United States”). 
 244. See Christopher L. Blakesley & Dan E. Stigall, The Myopia of U.S. v. 
Martinelli: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the 21st Century, 39 GEO. WASH. 
INT’L L. REV. 1, 18 (2007) (noting that “countries of civil law tradition” general-
ly allow a nation-state to prosecute its own nationals for crimes committed 
abroad, “[b]ut most require that double criminality apply—that the offense be 
punishable in the place where it was committed as well”); Amy Fraley, Note, 
Child Sex Tourism Under the PROTECT Act: Does It Really Protect?, 79 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 445, 475–76 (2005) (describing a Swedish law that requires 
dual criminality as a precondition to the prosecution of Swedish citizens for 
crimes committed abroad); David C. Weiss, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practic-
es Act, SEC Disgorgement of Profits, and the Evolving International Bribery 
Regime: Weighing Proportionality, Retribution, and Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 471, 494 (2009) (surveying different states’ approaches to criminaliz-
ing foreign acts of bribery by their nationals and noting that “some States em-
ploy a dual criminality requirement for a finding of nationality jurisdiction, 
insisting that the conduct in question be a crime in the place where it occurred 
  
2010] DUAL ILLEGALITY 169 
 
Outside the criminal extradition context, English courts 
have also long acknowledged a rule of double accountability to 
restrain them from awarding tort damages for conduct that is 
not wrong in the place where committed. In accordance with 
the landmark case of Phillips v. Eyre, the double-accountability 
rule provides that “the wrong must be of such a character that 
it would have been actionable if committed in England,” and 
that “the act must not have been justifiable by the law of the 
place where it was done.”245  
Although U.S. courts have not embraced the Phillips 
rule,246 it is far from novel for Congress to predicate the scope 
of federal law upon the law of another jurisdiction. The Federal 
Tort Claims Act, for example, authorizes an award of tort dam-
ages against the United States “under circumstances where the 
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claim-
ant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or 
omission occurred.”247 
 
and that the party against whom sanctions are to be imposed is a national of 
the imposing State”).  
 245. See Phillips v. Eyre, [1870] 6 L.R.Q.B. 1, 28–29 (Willes J.) (invoking a 
rule to bar recovery in a court in England for a tort allegedly committed by the 
English governor of Jamaica in circumstances where the governor ’s alleged 
abuses were clearly immunized under Jamaican law); see also Wiwa v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 100 & n.6 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing the Phillips 
rule); Peter Handford, Edward John Eyre and the Conflict of Laws, 32 MELB. 
U. L. REV. 822, 825 & n.23 (2008) (noting that the Phillips rule has been su-
perseded by statute in the United Kingdom except for defamation cases). The 
Phillips rule did not find favor as a rule of pre-Erie federal common law in the 
United States Supreme Court. See Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 670 
(1892) (stating that the Phillips rule “is not the law of this [C]ourt” and that 
“[b]y our law, a private action may be maintained in one State, if not contrary 
to its own policy, for such a wrong done in another and actionable there, al-
though a like wrong would not be actionable in the State where the suit is 
brought”). I am grateful to Professor Dodge for calling the double-
accountability rule of Phillips to my attention as a useful analogue to my pro-
posed dual-illegality rule. 
 246. See, e.g., Cuba R.R. Co. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 473 (1912) (reversing 
a Third Circuit decision that relied in part on the Phillips rule); Huntington, 
146 U.S. at 670. 
 247. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006). Because the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA) has an exclusion for claims arising in foreign countries, see 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2680(k) (2006), this provision refers to the laws of states within the United 
States. See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994) (holding that the 
FTCA’s “reference to the ‘law of the place’ means law of the State—the source 
of substantive liability under the FTCA”); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 
1, 11–16 (1962) (finding that “law of the place” in the FTCA refers to law of the 
state where the negligent act occurred, not the law of the state where the neg-
ligent act had an operative and harmful effect from the crash of the plane). 
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A dual-illegality rule in the U.S. extraterritoriality context 
would embrace the best elements of both judicial unilateralism 
and judicial territorialism, all while avoiding the pitfalls of 
judicial interests balancing. Most significantly, it would pre-
serve the core of strict territoriality by presuming that each na-
tion-state has exclusive power to decide what kind of conduct 
within its own borders is proscribed or otherwise subject to 
regulation. Absent the clear intent of Congress, U.S. law would 
not prohibit or regulate extraterritorial conduct—such as the 
alleged extraterritorial price-fixing by British companies in the 
Hartford Fire case—that is perfectly legal or nonregulated in 
the place where it occurred.  
Dual illegality is not a return to anachronistic territorial-
ism. In contrast to strict territoriality, the dual-illegality rule 
would allow some U.S. courts to sit in judgment of violations of 
shared norms that occur in foreign countries (at least in cases 
where the United States otherwise has a prima facie interest in 
regulating the conduct and, of course, where U.S. courts prop-
erly have personal jurisdiction over a defendant). The dual-
illegality rule would thereby open the way for U.S. courts to 
apply U.S. law to much of the foreign-based conduct that would 
otherwise fall within the scope of broad application of the ef-
fects, protective, or universal principles of jurisdiction. And it 
would allow the application of U.S. law where strict territorial-
ist concerns serve little purpose, such as where an offender has 
broken the law of the territorial state but fled to the United 
States.248 
The dual-illegality rule would capitalize on the increasing 
convergence among many nation-states on criminal and regula-
tory standards. For example, broad consensus exists on crimi-
nal prohibitions against corruption, smuggling, and money 
laundering.249 Broad consensus also exists on norms against 
 
 248. Of course, in such a case the United States might also have the option 
to extradite the offender to the foreign state where the criminal act took place. 
 249. See, e.g., United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 
58/4, ch. III, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Nov. 21, 2003); United Nations Convention 
Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex II, art. 15(5), 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Jan. 8, 2001); Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory 
Litigation, supra note 30, at 301–02 (contending that there is “broad consen-
sus on some issues” in “the area of criminal behavior that gives rise to RICO 
claims,” such as that “[e]very state collects taxes and prohibits nonpayment” 
and that “there are shared policies on the deterrence of particular crimes, in-
cluding money laundering, bribery, and smuggling”). 
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gross abuses of human rights.250 As for civil economic regula-
tion, “while it is unlikely that every jurisdiction will share a 
regulatory approach to the letter, it is fair to conclude that 
some basics have the agreement of all regulating jurisdictions,” 
such as for “hard-core price-fixing” in the antitrust context.251 
Broad consensus exists against security fraud,252 and progress 
toward the adoption of International Disclosure Standards and 
International Accounting Standards holds promise for far 
greater consensus in other regulatory areas of securities law.253 
Moreover, to the extent that some jurisdictions lack antitrust or 
securities laws, they may have generally applicable fraud, em-
bezzlement, and unfair trade practice laws that could satisfy a 
dual-illegality requirement for conduct that is criminalized by a 
different name under U.S. law. 
While affirming a foreign state’s exclusive authority to de-
cide the substantive rule of conduct for those that act within its 
territory, the dual-illegality rule does not allow a foreign state 
to enact a rule and then bottle up its application or enforce-
ment against persons who are otherwise subject to personal ju-
risdiction in the United States. This comports with the general 
principle in U.S. domestic law that one U.S. state government’s 
authority to announce a legal rule does not in turn preclude 
another U.S. state government from giving a remedy for a vi-
olation in the first state of that same rule. In Tennessee Coal, 
Iron, & Railroad Co. v. George, a worker who was injured in 
Alabama filed suit in Georgia for violation of an Alabama defec-
tive-machinery statute that required that any suit for its viola-
tion must be brought in a state court of Alabama and not else-
 
 250. Chapter IV: Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en (last visited 
Oct. 19, 2010) (listing major multilateral human rights treaties). 
 251. See Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, supra note 30, at 301. 
 252. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 175 (2d Cir. 
2008) (stating that “while registration requirements may widely vary, anti-
fraud enforcement objectives are broadly similar as governments and other 
regulators are generally in agreement that [securities] fraud should be dis-
couraged”; that for cases of fraud, “[t]he primary interest of [a foreign state] is 
in the righting of a wrong done to an entity created by it”; and that “[i]f our 
anti-fraud laws are stricter than [a foreign state’s], that country will surely 
not be offended by their application” (internal quotations and citations omit-
ted)), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). As noted above, the Supreme Court in af-
firming the Second Circuit’s ruling disapproved of its reasoning and also ex-
pressed concern about potential conflicts between U.S. and foreign securities 
laws. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885–86. 
 253. See Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, supra note 30, at 299. 
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where.254 The Supreme Court noted that venue was no part of 
the underlying right to be enforced, and that “a State cannot 
create a transitory cause of action and at the same time destroy 
the right to sue on that transitory cause of action in any court 
having jurisdiction.”255 More generally, the Court observed that 
“jurisdiction is to be determined by the law of the court’s crea-
tion [in Georgia] and cannot be defeated by the extraterritorial 
operation of a statute of another State [Alabama], even though 
it created the right of action.”256  
More recently, the Supreme Court has acknowledged a 
similar principle between the dual jurisdictions of federal and 
state courts. Federal courts often exercise their habeas jurisdic-
tion to review the constitutional propriety of criminal convic-
tions that have occurred in state courts.257 For the last two dec-
ades, however, the Court has declined to allow federal courts to 
announce or give retroactive effect to new rules of federal con-
stitutional criminal procedure when in the context of reviewing 
state court criminal proceedings.258 Recently, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that this limitation should not be made 
mandatory for state courts—in other words, that state courts 
are free to announce or give retroactive effect to new rules of 
constitutional criminal procedure, despite the remedial bar 
against federal courts doing so.259 Again, the prevailing prin-
ciple is that one jurisdiction’s authority to announce a rule of 
substantive conduct should not ordinarily preclude another ju-
risdiction from choosing to adopt and apply that rule within its 
own juridical system.260 True enough, a state or juridical entity 
 
 254. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 358 (1914). 
 255. Id. at 360. 
 256. Id.; see also Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 313–14 (2006) (apply-
ing the rule of Tennessee Coal to conclude that the Texas state court did not 
have exclusive jurisdiction to preclude a judgment by the federal district court 
concerning rights under Texas state law). 
 257. See, e.g., Banks v. Thaler, 583 F.3d 295, 299–300 (5th Cir. 2009) (exer-
cising habeas jurisdiction to review the propriety of a murder conviction in 
light of the state’s nondisclosure of witness interview transcripts), cert. denied, 
130 S. Ct. 2092 (2010). 
 258. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 305–10 (1989). 
 259. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 275–82 (2008). 
 260. More recently, the Federal Customs Service of the Russian Federation 
hired U.S. lawyers to sue the Bank of New York in a Russian court, alleging 
that certain of the bank’s activities violated the U.S. Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act and that a Russian court had authority to 
enforce U.S. law. See Sara Rhodin, Testimony About a U.S. Law in Russian 
Bank Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 14111526. The 
case eventually settled without resolution of the Russian court’s authority. See 
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may geographically restrict itself from applying its own rules 
extraterritorially (just as the federal presumption against 
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws purportedly does for 
U.S. courts). This limitation should not impede the United 
States from adopting and enforcing the same substantive rule 
of conduct chosen by other foreign states where the conduct in 
question takes place.  
B. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO THE DUAL-ILLEGALITY RULE 
Critics of a dual-illegality rule could raise several objec-
tions. First, they could argue that a dual-illegality rule inap-
propriately undervalues foreign state interests because it re-
quires neither that a foreign state formally consent to the 
United States’ exercise of jurisdiction nor that the United 
States defer to a foreign state’s wishes about whether and how 
the rule should be enforced. Indeed, at least some critics of U.S. 
extraterritorialism object not just to the United States impos-
ing its substantive values to regulate foreign conduct, but also 
imposing its procedures and appurtenant baggage—including 
American-style jury decisionmaking, class action devices, at-
torney fee-payment structures, wide-ranging and expensive 
pre-trial discovery mechanisms, and potential punitive or 
treble damage remedies.261 In Empagran, for example, the Su-
preme Court noted that “even where nations agree about pri-
mary conduct, say, price fixing, they disagree dramatically 
about appropriate remedies,” and “[t]he application, for exam-
ple, of American private treble-damages remedies to anticom-
petitive conduct taking place abroad has generated considera-
ble controversy.”262 
These concerns are not insubstantial, but they are of 
second-order significance next to the primary right of the for-
eign state to decide the substantive conduct rule. Further, they 
 
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Russia Drops $22.5 Billion Suit Against Bank of New 
York, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG (OCT. 22, 2009, 6:43 AM), http://dealbook 
.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/22/russia-drops-225-billion-suit-vs-bank-of-new-york/. 
The Russian case differs from the dual-illegality scenarios suggested in this 
Article because it involved a foreign court’s authority to directly apply foreign 
statutory law, as opposed to a U.S. court’s application of U.S. law that is mere-
ly consistent with foreign law. 
 261. See, e.g., Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, supra note 
30, at 296–97; Ugo Mattei & Jeffrey Lena, U.S. Jurisdiction over Conflicts 
Arising Outside the United States: Some Hegemonic Implications, 24 
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 381, 390–95 (2001). 
 262. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 167 (2004). 
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are equally implicated by a judicial unilateralist approach, 
which would apply U.S. law to some kinds of conduct that are 
not even illegal or regulated in the territory where the conduct 
took place. Such concerns about procedural differences in the 
American enforcement system hazard a whiff of hypocrisy 
when cited to excuse actors from accountability for violation of 
a shared-norm substantive rule. If a foreign state has decided 
that particular acts are dangerous or noxious enough to be out-
lawed or civilly regulated in a certain manner, it is ill-
positioned to complain that the United States has chosen to 
embrace and pursue a violation with greater vigor against a de-
fendant (over whom the United States otherwise has personal 
jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause).  
In any event, the dual-illegality rule would not invariably 
require that U.S. law be applied to dually illegal foreign con-
duct. If political or fairness concerns seem to counsel that any 
particular case should be adjudicated in the country where the 
conduct took place rather than in the United States, the dual-
illegality rule would not foreclose the United States in criminal 
cases from granting a request for extradition.263 Nor would it 
foreclose U.S. courts in civil cases from dismissing actions in-
volving foreign conduct under the doctrine of forum non conven-
iens264 or for failure to exhaust foreign law remedies.265  
Critics of a dual-illegality rule might also argue that the 
rule would be ineffective or impractical to apply because it 
would be rare for U.S. law to coincide with foreign law. In Em-
pagran, for example, the Court voiced concern about U.S. 
courts “hav[ing] to examine how foreign law, compared with 
American law, treats not only price fixing but also, say, infor-
mation-sharing agreements, patent-licensing price conditions, 
territorial product resale limitations, and various forms of joint 
venture, in respect to both primary conduct and remedy.”266 
 
 263. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2006) (statute on extradition of foreign fu-
gitives from the United States). 
 264. See, e.g., Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, Inc., 578 F.3d 1283, 
1300 (11th Cir. 2009) (affirming the dismissal of an ATS claim involving al-
leged human rights abuses in Guatemala on ground of forum non conveniens), 
petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3689 (U.S. May 10, 2010). 
 265. See, e.g., Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1025–26 
(W.D. Wash. 2005) (dismissing, on failure-to-exhaust grounds, a Torture Vic-
tim Protection Act claim brought by the family of a peace activist crushed in 
Israel by a bulldozer manufactured by the defendant), aff’d on other grounds, 
503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007).  
 266. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 168. The dual-illegality argument that is ad-
vanced in this Article was not made in the Empagran case. The dicta about 
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Similarly, in Morrison, the Court observed in the securities 
context that “the regulation of other countries often differs from 
ours as to what constitutes fraud, what disclosures must be 
made, what damages are recoverable, what discovery is availa-
ble in litigation, what individual actions may be joined in a sin-
gle suit, what attorney’s fees are recoverable, and many other 
matters.”267 
But those are concerns that have long been surmounted in 
the extradition context (which the Court in Empagran and 
Morrison did not acknowledge). Dual criminality in the extradi-
tion context requires only that the conduct at issue be illegal 
under the law of both states. The crimes need not have the 
same name, they need not have the same legal elements, and 
they need not be subject to the same penalty or punishment.268 
“When the laws of both the requesting and the requested party 
appear to be directed to the same basic evil, the statutes are 
substantially analogous, and can form the basis of dual crimi-
nality.”269 Moreover, “that defenses may be available in the re-
 
the difficulties of matching U.S. and foreign law was in response to plaintiffs’ 
argument that the courts should apply prescriptive comity on a case-by-case 
basis to decide if foreign sensibilities would be offended by application of U.S. 
law to conduct that did not have any effect within the United States. See id. 
 267. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2885 (2010).  
 268. See Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 312 (1922) (“The law does not re-
quire that the name by which the crime is described in the two countries shall 
be the same; nor that the scope of the liability shall be coextensive, or, in other 
respects, the same in the two countries. It is enough if the particular act 
charged is criminal in both jurisdictions.”); RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 476 
cmt. d (noting that “the fact that a particular act is classified differently in the 
criminal law of the two states does not prevent extradition under the double 
criminality rule,” and that “[f ]or instance, if the requesting state charged the 
person sought with embezzlement but the acts alleged would constitute larce-
ny by trick or fraud in the requested state, extradition would be required”); see 
also Hafen, supra note 242, at 199–207 (discussing the evolution of U.S. law 
interpreting the dual-criminality requirement). 
 269. Clarey v. Gregg, 138 F.3d 764, 766 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal citation 
omitted) (quoting Peters v. Egnor, 888 F.2d 713, 719 (10th Cir. 1989)). Com-
pare Theron v. U.S. Marshal, 832 F.2d 492, 496–98 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding 
that a broadly worded South African statute criminalizing the failure of an 
adjudicated insolvent to disclose his insolvency when obtaining credit was suf-
ficiently analogous to a U.S. statute criminalizing false statements to a bank; 
“[a]dmittedly, South Africa’s law is broader than [US law], but both laws can 
be used to punish the failure to disclose a loan applicant’s liabilities to a bank 
when obtaining credit,” and “it is immaterial that South Africa’s law is broad-
er than the analogous law in this country”), with United States v. Khan, 993 
F.2d 1368, 1372–73 (9th Cir. 1993) (reversing the conviction of defendant on a 
drug charge on grounds that a Pakistani law of conspiracy was not sufficiently 
analogous to a U.S. criminal statute prohibiting the use of a telephone to facil-
itate a drug offense). 
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quested state that would not be available in the requesting 
state, or that different requirements of proof are applicable in 
the two states, does not defeat extradition under the dual crim-
inality principle.”270 In short, the dual-criminality rule has long 
been functionally and flexibly applied in the extradition context 
to ensure substantive similarity and it has been done so with-
out regard to insubstantial differences between two nations’ 
laws. 
In the same way, a dual-illegality rule should filter out 
immaterial differences between laws and adjust for differences 
to ensure that the two nations’ laws are viewed in a parallel 
manner. Consider, for example, a geoambiguous U.S. law that 
prohibits destruction of U.S. government property.271 To decide 
whether this law would allow prosecution in a U.S. court of the 
destruction of U.S. government property in a foreign country, 
the dual-illegality rule would properly inquire whether the for-
eign state’s law similarly prohibits destruction of its own gov-
ernment’s property, not whether it specifically outlaws destroy-
ing U.S. government property or the property of other foreign 
governments. The two laws, then, would be substantially anal-
ogous as required in the extradition context. 
Critics might also contend that the location of the conduct 
at issue may be difficult to identify. Does “conduct” mean the 
human act that proximately causes harm or is it the resulting 
harm itself? Most criminal and regulatory statutes target hu-
man action (or human action resulting in specific harms), ra-
ther than targeting only the results of human action in the ab-
stract. The law prohibits murder and fraud, not death and loss 
of money. In deciding where the conduct took place, the dual-
illegality rule would necessarily look to the place of the human 
act that constitutes the prohibited or regulated act or that prox-
imately causes the consequences within the scope of the prohi-
bition or regulation. In my river-dumping case above, the regu-
lated conduct was discharge of toxic waste in Canada, not the 
later contamination of a lake in the United States which was 
the result of human conduct in Canada.272 Similarly, in Morri-
 
 270. RESTATEMENT, supra note 6, § 476 cmt. d. 
 271. See 18 U.S.C. § 1361 (2006) (prescribing criminal penalties for anyone 
who “willfully injures or commits any depredation against any property of the 
United States,” but without specifying whether the statute applies to destruc-
tion of U.S. government property outside of the United States). 
 272. Thus, U.S. courts should not be free to rationalize away an extraterri-
toriality problem by conflating a human act with its nonanthropogenic conse-
quences. See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1078 (9th 
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son, the Court had little difficulty identifying the location of the 
conduct subject to regulation as foreign, regardless of the 
transactions’ taint from fraudulent conduct within the United 
States or any effect that these foreign-based transactions might 
have had on U.S. markets.273 
Still, critics might contend that some kinds of conduct—
like use of the Internet—defy geographical specificity. Even if 
true, this is a problem that equally plagues application of the 
currently reigning presumption against extraterritoriality as 
much as it would burden a new rule of dual illegality. Both 
rules require courts to decide where the conduct subject to reg-
ulation has taken place. In any event, other commentators have 
convincingly debunked the myth that the Internet has no one 
locus and is not amenable to territory-based regulation by na-
tional governments.274 Recent events in China have demon-
strated the general regulatory effectiveness—for better or 
worse—of national, territory-based controls on Internet activi-
ty.275  
Would a dual-illegality rule extinguish all conflicts and 
concerns about the projection of U.S. law to regulate conduct 
that occurs in other countries? Would it always be clear wheth-
er a U.S. law has a substantially analogous foreign counter-
 
Cir. 2006) (holding that CERCLA was not “extraterritorially” applied to a 
company in Canada that disposed of slag in a river in Canada, because the “re-
lease” of toxics from the slag occurred upon the slag coming to rest in U.S. wa-
ters); Zhang, supra note 235, at 545 (criticizing Pakootas and arguing that its 
“strained legal fiction, which bifurcates an act of international pollution into 
two separate events in two countries, allowed the court to avoid evaluating the 
decision’s ramifications for international law and comity”).  
 273. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883–86 
(2010) (observing that the “focus” of the securities law is “upon purchases and 
sales of securities in the United States” and that “[i]t is those transactions 
that the statute seeks to ‘regulate’”); see also id. at 2886–87 (noting distinction 
between the securities laws and a general wire-fraud statute that punishes 
“fraud simpliciter ” in the United States without reference to the location of 
any foreign target or transaction).  
 274. See Goldsmith, supra note 58, at 480–82 (describing the means by 
which national governments may regulate in-territory users of the Internet, 
in-territory Internet service providers, and in-territory physical equipment for 
Internet transmission); see also F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The 
Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 68–69 (2004) (noting that the 
views of Goldsmith and other “cyberskeptics” are now “orthodoxy,” and that “it 
is certainly true that geographically-delimited nation-states have not aban-
doned their claims to regulate transactions that affect them”). 
 275. See, e.g., Sharon LaFraniere, Censors Put Tighter Grip on Internet in 
China, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2009, at A18, available at 2009 WLNR 25473299 
(describing new Chinese Internet controls). 
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part? Almost certainly not. But by restoring the primacy of for-
eign territorial states to decide the legality and regulability of 
acts that take place on their territory, the dual-illegality rule 
would go a considerable distance toward reducing concerns 
about antidemocratic overextension of U.S. law. When disputes 
arise about where certain conduct has taken place or whether 
the U.S. law at issue is substantially analogous to the law of 
the territorial state, judges can decide these purely legal issues 
without enmeshing themselves in evaluating the comparative 
interests at stake or the harm-protecting purposes and merits 
of the U.S. law, as judges do now under the current judicial-
unilateralist and interests-balancing approaches. 
Critics of the dual-illegality rule might argue that it gives 
safe harbor to wrongdoers to harm the United States from 
countries with weak or vague laws that don’t match up to U.S. 
regulatory standards. True. But this is a cost of our nation-
state system and the respect that judges should presumptively 
accord to states that choose to regulate differently than we do. 
In any event, this safe-harbor objection overlooks at least three 
limitations on the dual-illegality rule’s application.  
First, the dual-illegality rule is no more than a default rule 
of statutory construction for geoambiguous statutes. Congress 
remains free—as it already has for scores of statutes, including 
for a broad range of terrorism crimes and for any serious as-
sault or killing of a U.S. national—to expressly extend U.S. law 
to harmful extraterritorial acts.276 What the dual-illegality rule 
would do is stop our judges from making policy decisions about 
the wisdom or need to extend U.S. law when Congress has not 
seen fit to do so.  
Second, the dual-illegality rule would not apply to U.S.  
statutes that regulate acts that occur in whole or in part within 
the United States, even if such regulation simultaneously 
reaches some foreign-based activity or is otherwise intended to 
have extraterritorial effects. For example, it would have no ap-
plication to the federal statute that prohibits any person from 
traveling from the United States with the intent to engage in 
sexual abuse of a child in a foreign country; this statute crimi-
nalizes an act (travel) that takes place in part on U.S. territo-
ry.277  
 
 276. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2332, 2332a, 2332f(b)(2) (2006); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2332b (2006 & Supp. II 2007–2009).  
 277. A federal child-sex-tourism statute prohibits persons from “travel[ing] 
in foreign commerce, for the purpose of engaging in any illicit sexual conduct.” 
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Third, the dual-illegality rule would pose no obstacle to 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law in cases where foreign 
countries have agreed by general treaty or specific consent to 
allow the adjudication of extraterritorial violations in U.S. 
courts.278 Of course, if a foreign country has laws similar to the 
United States but simply chooses not to enforce them, the dual-
illegality rule would not offer wrongdoers a safe harbor. 
This proposed rule of dual illegality for U.S. courts would 
be employed when deciding whether to apply U.S. law to acts 
that occur wholly in other foreign countries. The dual-illegality 
rule would, in essence, require courts to abstain from applying 
geoambiguous laws to foreign conduct absent a determination 
that the conduct was subject to the same prohibition or regula-
tion in the foreign state where the act took place. Although se-
rious objections to a dual-illegality rule may be asserted, dual 
illegality has well-established roots in the practice states al-
ready follow for granting international criminal extradition. 
Furthermore, a dual-illegality rule is superior to competing ap-
proaches of judicial territorialism, unilateralism, and interests 
balancing. 
  CONCLUSION   
Globalization has long betrayed the reasons why it once 
made sense to confine U.S. law to regulate only what happens 
on U.S. territory. Congress has responded in part by extending 
some of its laws to criminalize or regulate conduct in other 
countries. Much of federal law, however, is geoambiguous, and 
our courts have been left to decide how far U.S. law should 
reach. The Supreme Court has announced a presumption 
against extraterritoriality, but thinly and inconsistently ap-
plied it in a manner that bespeaks substantive discord about 
whether and why U.S. law should apply abroad. Scholars alike 
 
See id. § 2423(b) (2006). As applied to a U.S. citizen who leaves the United 
States for a child-sex-tourism destination, this is a territorial law that would 
not be subject to the dual-illegality rule, regardless whether the destination 
foreign country has comparable legal protections.  
 278. For example, the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act authorizes 
U.S. courts to exercise jurisdiction over narcotics trafficking conduct that has 
no nexus to the United States except for the consent of the government of the 
foreign-flag vessel on the high seas or consent of the government of the terri-
torial seas travelled by a ship that has been interdicted by U.S. law enforce-
ment authorities. The law does not require that the country giving consent al-
so have a comparable law against narcotics trafficking. See 46 U.S.C. 
§§ 70502, 70503 (2006). 
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have divided. Judicial territorialists suggest that our courts 
should not construe U.S. law to apply abroad absent a clear-
statement of Congress or consent of the affected foreign coun-
tries. Judicial unilateralists suggest that our courts should lib-
erally apply U.S. law to respond to unwanted effects in the 
United States from foreign-source conduct. Judicial interests 
balancers suggest that our courts should apply U.S. law abroad 
only if reasonable in light of a multitude of interest-based fac-
tors.  
This Article has criticized all these approaches and ad-
vanced a new rule of dual illegality that U.S. courts should use 
to decide the geographical scope of geoambiguous laws. The 
dual-illegality rule preserves the paramount interest of nation-
state territoriality by allowing foreign states to decide what 
conduct in their own territory is illegal or subject to regulation. 
Yet, departing from strict territoriality, the dual-illegality rule 
also allows extraterritorial application of U.S. law when U.S. 
law is substantially the same as the law of the territorial state. 
Dual illegality would reduce judicially initiated jurisdictional 
contestability by deferring to the substance of a foreign state’s 
law. U.S. courts applying the dual-illegality rule would contin-
ue to consider at the outset whether a prima facie prescriptive 
jurisdictional basis exists (such as under the effects, protective, 
and universal principles). However, the dual-illegality rule 
would leave the ultimate determination of whether a geoambig-
uous law should extend abroad to depend upon a legal judg-
ment of the comparative scope of U.S. and foreign law, rather 
than upon policy-like judgments about the nature of the harm, 
the scope of universal crimes under customary international 
law, or the strength of the policy interests of the United States 
in having its law apply.  
The dual-illegality rule would not prevent the United 
States from superseding foreign law. It is merely a default rule 
of interpretation for judges when Congress has chosen not to 
extend its law abroad. Nor will the dual-illegality rule con-
strain courts from applying U.S. law with full force to acts that 
take place in part within the United States (even if they have 
foreign effects) or to extraterritorial acts for which foreign 
states have agreed should be subject to adjudication by U.S. 
courts. When faced with applying a geoambiguous U.S. law to 
wholly foreign conduct, U.S. courts should apply the dual-
illegality rule.  
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  APPENDIX: A GEOGRAPHICAL CLASSIFICATION  
OF FEDERAL CRIMES   
This Appendix lists a broad range of federal criminal stat-
utes by reference to their apparent geographical scope. The list 
below is illustrative and does not include all federal crimes. The 
listed crimes fall into three broad groups: (A) explicitly terri-
torial crimes (criminal statutes restricted to acts that take 
place inside the United States), (B) explicitly extraterritorial 
crimes (criminal statutes that plainly extend to extraterritorial 
acts), and (C) geoambiguous crimes (criminal statutes that are 
not clear about their geographical scope).  
A. EXPLICITLY TERRITORIAL CRIMES  
Numerous federal criminal statutes have language indicat-
ing their application to domestic acts only, such as a require-
ment that the act occur inside the United States or that it occur 
within the “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction” of the 
United States or that it occur in some other manner that makes 
clear that the forbidden act must almost certainly occur on 
U.S.-controlled territory. See, for example, 18 U.S.C. § 372 
(2006) (conspiracy by any two persons in the United States to 
impede or injure a federal officer); 18 U.S.C. §§ 478–480 (2006) 
(generally prohibiting counterfeiting, passing, or fraudulent 
possession of foreign government security or obligation “within 
the United States”); 18 U.S.C. § 661 (2006) (theft within special 
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States); 18 
U.S.C. § 917 (2006) (impersonation “within the United States” 
of a member of the American National Red Cross); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 951 (2006) (prohibiting anyone other than diplomats from 
“act[ing] in the United States as an agent of a foreign govern-
ment without prior notification to the Attorney General”); 18 
U.S.C. § 956 (2006) (prohibiting persons within the United 
States from conspiring to “kill, kidnap, maim, or injure persons 
or damage property in a foreign country”); 18 U.S.C. §§ 959–
962 (2006) (prohibiting anyone “within the United States” from 
enlisting in a foreign service, participating in expeditions 
against friendly nations, and strengthening or arming a vessel 
of a foreign nation). 
B. EXPLICITLY EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIMES 
Many federal criminal statutes explicitly apply to extrater-
ritorial acts. As listed below, these statutes can be classified in-
to three groups: (1) U.S.-nationality-based extraterritorial 
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crimes (e.g., the offender is a U.S. national); (2) U.S.-effects-
based extraterritorial crimes (e.g., a harm or effect results 
within the United States or against a U.S. citizen or official); 
and (3) universal extraterritorial crimes (e.g., a crime for which 
there is no requirement of any showing of any connection to the 
United States or its citizenry). Each of these statutes is deemed 
“explicitly” extraterritorial because either it has a provision ex-
pressly directing that it should be applied extraterritorially or 
it has a provision directing that it may be applied against any 
defendant who is later present or otherwise found within the 
United States. 
1. U.S.-Nationality-Based Extraterritorial Crimes  
Some federal criminal statutes explicitly apply to extrater-
ritorial acts, but only if the offender or victim is a U.S. national 
or has some similar residency connection to the United States. 
See, for example, 18 U.S.C. § 38 (2006) (prohibiting extraterri-
torial false statements concerning “any aircraft or space vehicle 
part” when “in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce” and 
if the offender or victim is a U.S. national or “an act in further-
ance of the offense was committed in the United States”); 18 
U.S.C. § 175 (2006) (possession of biological weapons, with 
“extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this 
section committed by or against a national of the United 
States”); 18 U.S.C. § 175c (2006) (possession or use of the vari-
ola virus “outside of the United States” by or against a U.S. na-
tional); 18 U.S.C. § 229 (2006) (possession of chemical weapons 
if offender or victim is a U.S. national or if a chemical weapon 
is used against property that is owned, used, or leased by the 
United States); 18 U.S.C. § 953 (2006) (prohibiting “[a]ny citi-
zen of the United States, wherever he may be,” from conducting 
certain correspondence with foreign governments); 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1831, 1837(1) (2006) (theft or misappropriation of a trade se-
cret by a U.S. national outside the United States if “intending 
or knowing that the offense will benefit any foreign govern-
ment, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent”); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2332a (2006) (use of a weapon of mass destruction against a 
U.S. national abroad or by a U.S. national abroad); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2423(b) (2006) (prohibiting a “United States citizen or an 
alien admitted for permanent residence in the United States” 
from “travel[ing] in foreign commerce, for the purpose of engag-
ing in any illicit sexual conduct”); 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2006) (il-
licit sexual acts in foreign places by “[a]ny United States citizen 
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or alien admitted for permanent residence who travels in for-
eign commerce”).  
2. U.S.-Effects-Based Extraterritorial Crimes  
Some federal criminal statutes apply to extraterritorial 
acts but only if such acts create or threaten an adverse effect 
within the United States or if such acts otherwise victimize 
U.S. nationals or U.S. government officials (wherever they may 
be). See, for example, 18 U.S.C. § 351 (2006) (assault, kidnap-
ping, or killing of high-level U.S. government officials); 18 
U.S.C. § 470 (2006) (prohibiting counterfeiting of U.S. obliga-
tions or securities anywhere “outside the United States”); 18 
U.S.C. § 877 (2006) (mailing a threatening communication from 
a foreign country to the United States); 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2006 
& Supp. II 2009) (witness tampering); 18 U.S.C. § 2114(a) 
(2006) (assault on any person in custody of “any money or other 
property of the United States”); 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2006) (gener-
ally prohibiting creating a visual depiction of child pornography 
in foreign countries if intended or known that the depiction is 
to be transmitted to the United States); 21 U.S.C. § 959 (2006) 
(prohibiting the manufacture or distribution of controlled sub-
stances while intending or knowing that they will be imported 
into the United States and stating that “[t]his section is in-
tended to reach acts of manufacture or distribution committed 
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States”). 
3. Universal Jurisdiction Crimes  
Some federal criminal statutes explicitly apply to extrater-
ritorial acts and effectively allow universal jurisdiction because 
they do not require any kind of a link between the prohibited 
conduct and U.S. territory or any U.S. citizen or official. See, 
for example, 18 U.S.C. § 37 (2006 & Supp. II 2009) (violence at 
international airports); 18 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (assault on “for-
eign official, official guest, or internationally protected person”); 
18 U.S.C. § 831 (2006) (prohibiting transactions involving nuc-
lear materials); 18 U.S.C. § 832 (2006) (participation in nuclear 
and weapons of mass destruction threats to the United States); 
18 U.S.C. § 878 (2006) (threats or extortion against foreign offi-
cials, official guests, or internationally protected persons); 18 
U.S.C. § 1091 (2006) (authorizing prosecution of genocide if de-
fendant is at some point “present” in the United States); 18 
U.S.C. § 1201 (2006) (kidnapping of “internationally protected 
persons”); 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (2006) (taking of a hostage “to com-
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pel a third person or a governmental organization to do or ab-
stain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for 
the release of the person detained”); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581, 1583, 
1589, 1596(a) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (peonage, enticement into 
slavery, and forced labor if defendant is at some point “present” 
in United States); 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006) (piracy on the high 
seas); 18 U.S.C. § 2251A (2006) (selling or buying of children for 
use in child pornography); 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2006) (torture); 
18 U.S.C. § 2442 (Supp. II 2008) (recruitment of child soldiers); 
21 U.S.C. § 959 (2006) (manufacture or distribution of narcotics 
intending or knowing it will be imported illegally into the Unit-
ed States). 
C. GEOAMBIGUOUS CRIMES  
Numerous U.S. federal criminal statutes are geoambiguous 
in the sense that a U.S. court could plausibly apply them to 
wholly extraterritorial acts, either because the statute express-
ly refers to activity that affects or involves “foreign commerce” 
or because the statute has broadly and generally worded terms 
that have no apparent geographical limitation. See, for exam-
ple, 18 U.S.C. § 32 (2006) (destruction of motor vehicles used in 
foreign commerce); 18 U.S.C. § 36 (2006) (drive-by shootings in 
furtherance of major drug offenses); 18 U.S.C. § 39 (2006) (sale 
or use “in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce” of a traf-
fic signal preemption transmitter to a nonqualifying user); 18 
U.S.C. § 43 (2006) (travel in interstate or foreign commerce to 
damage an animal enterprise); 18 U.S.C. § 111 (2006 & Supp. 
II 2008) (assault on a federal employee); 18 U.S.C. § 115 (2006 
& Supp. II 2008) (assault, kidnap, or murder of a family mem-
ber of a federal officer); 18 U.S.C. § 116 (2006) (female genital 
mutilation); 18 U.S.C. § 119 (Supp. II 2008) (public disclosure 
of certain “restricted” information—such as home address, 
email, or Social Security number—to facilitate threat, intimida-
tion, or commission of crime against federal employees or other 
persons involved with federal investigations); 18 U.S.C. § 152 
(2006) (fraudulent concealment of bankrupt debtor assets); 18 
U.S.C. § 175b (2006) (possession “in or affecting interstate or 
foreign commerce” by “restricted persons” of certain biological 
agents, including as “restricted persons” citizens or agents of 
state-sponsored supporters of terrorism); 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006) 
(bribery of U.S. public officials and witnesses); 18 U.S.C. § 241 
(2006) (civil rights conspiracy); 18 U.S.C. § 247 (2006) (obstruc-
tion of free exercise of religious beliefs or defacement of reli-
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gious property if the offense “is in or affects interstate or for-
eign commerce”); 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2006) (obstructive conduct at 
reproductive health facilities); 18 U.S.C. § 331 (2006) (fraudu-
lent defacement of U.S. coinage); 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006) (con-
spiracy to commit U.S. offense or to defraud the United States); 
18 U.S.C. § 484 (2006) (prohibiting “connect[ing] together dif-
ferent parts of two or more notes, bills, or other genuine in-
struments issued under the authority of the United States, or 
by any foreign government, or corporation, as to produce one 
instrument, with intent to defraud”); 18 U.S.C. § 486 (2006) 
(prohibiting uttering or passing of “any coins of gold or silver or 
other metal, or alloys of metals, intended for use as current 
money, whether in the resemblance of coins of the United 
States or of foreign countries”); 18 U.S.C. § 511 (2006) (remov-
ing, altering, or tampering with “an identification number for a 
motor vehicle or motor vehicle part”); 18 U.S.C. § 555 (2006) 
(financing a border tunnel); 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2006) (theft, em-
bezzlement, or conversion of U.S. government property); 18 
U.S.C. § 659 (2006) (theft from the “interstate or foreign ship-
ment” of goods or merchandise); 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2006) (theft or 
bribery concerning program receiving federal funds); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 667 (2006) (theft or misappropriation of property “in connec-
tion with the marketing of livestock in interstate or foreign 
commerce”); 18 U.S.C. § 668 (2006) (knowing receipt, conceal-
ment, exhibiting, or disposing of major artwork stolen from 
museum “situated in the United States”); 18 U.S.C. § 700 
(2006) (flag burning and desecration of the U.S. flag); 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 792–798 (2006) (espionage and related offenses); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 871 (2006) (threats against the President or Vice President 
done by “deposit[ing] for conveyance in the mail or for a deli-
very from any post office or by any letter carrier”); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 873 (2006) (blackmail under “threat of informing” as to “any 
violation of any law of the United States”); 18 U.S.C. § 875 
(2006) (“transmit[ting] in interstate or foreign commerce” cer-
tain kinds of threats); 18 U.S.C. § 892 (2006) (extortionate ex-
tension of credit); 18 U.S.C. §§ 911–914 (2006) (impersonation 
of a U.S. citizen, U.S. government employee, or U.S. creditor); 
18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (2006) (unlawful possession of a machine-
gun); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006) (false statements “within the ju-
risdiction” of the U.S. government); 18 U.S.C. § 1031 (2006) 
(major contract or procurement fraud against the United 
States); 18 U.S.C. § 1037 (2006) (fraudulent hacking into pro-
tected computers and sending spam emails “in or affecting in-
terstate or foreign commerce”); 18 U.S.C. § 1361 (2006) (“in-
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jur[ing] or commit[ting] any depredation against any property 
of the United States”); 18 U.S.C. § 1366 (2006) (damaging an 
energy facility); 18 U.S.C. § 1661 (2006) (on-shore robbery by 
pirates); 18 U.S.C. § 2074 (2006) (false weather reports where 
purported to be issued by U.S. government service); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2119 (2006) (carjacking of vehicle “that has been transported, 
shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce”); 18 
U.S.C. § 2252B (2006) (use of misleading Internet domain name 
with intent to deceive a person or minor “into viewing material 
constituting obscenity”); 18 U.S.C. § 2252C (2006) (“knowingly 
embed[ding] words or digital images into the source code of a 
website with the intent to deceive a person into viewing ma-
terial constituting obscenity”). 
